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ARTICLE 
TRAVELERS, REASONED TEXTUALISM, 
AND THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE 
OF ERISA PREEMPTION 
Edward A. Zelinsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
Upon the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")/ few would have predicted that, a 
generation later, ERISA's provisions preempting state law would 
be front page news,^ a central topic of national debate about health 
care and its regulation. Similarly, few foresaw at the time ERISA 
was adopted that the United States Supreme Court would have 
great difficulty construing ERISA's preemption provisions. By the 
same token, in 1974 the contemporary revival of interest in 
statutory textualism lay well into the future. 
In 1999, in contrast, the relationship among HMOs, state law, 
and ERISA preemption is a major (and controversial) concern in 
efforts to craft national health care legislation; indeed, the 106th 
Congress has devoted considerable attention to the states' legal 
ability vel non to regulate managed care providers and to provide 
tort remedies against them. The Supreme Court, in three recent 
decisions, has, without acknowledging it, largely abandoned its 
prior approach to ERISA section 514, the provision of ERISA 
which explicitly preempts state law. Many commentators suggest 
• Edward A. Zelinsky is a professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
of Yeshiva University. He is grateful for comments received on earlier drafts of this 
article from Professors John H. Langbein, Jerry Mashaw, Norman Stein, and Lawrence 
Zelenak, and from Alvin D. Lurie, Esq. 
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)). 
2 See Lizette Alvarez, Eye on Polling, G.O.P. Unveils a Patients' Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 16, 1998, at Al; Robert Pear, Hands Tied, Judges Rue Law That Limits H.M.O. 
Liability, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at Al; Robert Pear, H.M.O. Group Backs Controls 
G.O.P. Rejects, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at Al; Robin Toner, Levered Issue, Second 
Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,1999, § 4, at 1; see also, Jonathan Cohn, Cosmetic Surgery, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 17/Aug. 24,1998, at 25 (cover story); Michael M. Weinstein, Getting 
Litigious With H.M.O.'s, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,1998, § 4, at 5. 
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that the failure of the Court's jurisprudence of ERISA preemption 
is a case of textualism gone awryf most welcome the Court's 
recent decisions as an appropriate, indeed overdue, revision of the 
Court's approach to section 514. 
Central to these controversies is the Court's decision in Shaw 
V. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,' in which the Court announced a capacious 
understanding of ERISA preemption, an understanding which 
makes preemption of state law nearly automatic in the context of 
employer pension and welfare plans. The critics have not been 
kind to Shaw, suggesting that it constitutes an exemplar of overly 
mechanistic, dictionary-based textualism. The Court's new 
jurisprudence of ERISA preemption, announced in New York 
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Insurance Co.,' places the Court, implicitly and in part, with the 
critics of Shaw. 
I depart from the conventional critique of Shaw and of the 
Court's original formulation of ERISA preemption insofar as that 
critique suggests that the Court should formulate its ERISA 
preemption case law with little (perhaps no) regard for the terms 
of the statute. To the contrary, I argue that ERISA preemption be 
approached from a vantage which can best be labeled "reasoned 
textualism." This approach is "textualist" because it emphasizes 
the statute as the primary source of law and defines its task as 
making the statute as workable as possible.® This approach is 
"reasoned" as it eschews a mechanical, dictionary-based 
textualism (properly disparaged by the critics of Shaw) and instead 
3 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme 
Court, 3O'ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 324 (1998) (criticizing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 
85 (1983), as an "easy, dictionary-driven, plain meaning disposition of the term ... [which] 
produced a flood of litigation for the lower federal courts"); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last 
Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of 
Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 39 (1996) ("If ever there were a case study of the 
failures of textualism as a method of statutory interpretation, this is it."); Peter D. 
Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achkying 
Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 ROUS. L. REV. 985, 990 (1998) (criticizing 
the Supreme Court for "a mechanical approach [to ERISA preemption] that adheres to a 
strict 'plain language' interpretation without questioning whether the result of these 
interpretations can be reconciled with congressional intent"). 
t 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
5 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
^ This textualist vantage differs both from policy-driven approaches, under which the 
courts fashion doctrine to achieve desired outcomes with minimal (if any) regard for the 
statutory terminology, and intent-based methodologies, which purport to discern the 
subjective intent of those who enacted ERISA. In the context of ERISA preemption, 
these two alternatives have more in common than first appears; and, in practice, niay 
amount to the same methodology, given the difficulty of finding intent in a statute like 
ERISA, a complex jumble of compromises and policies. See infra notes 201-07 and 
accompanying text. 
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views statutory interpretation as a constrained process of judgment 
and reflection. TTie underlying premise of such reasoned 
textualism is that, in an area like the federal regulation of 
employee benefit plans, an area of many and imperfect policy 
judgments. Congress is the principal policymaker, a policymaker 
which, however imprecisely and inelegantly, speaks through 
statutes. 
Approaching ERISA preemption through the motif of 
reasoned textualism, the most compelling understanding of 
ERISA section 514 is that it commands greater than usual 
preemption scrutiny but that, by itself, section 514 does not answer 
the preemption inquiry. Section 514 should thus not be read as the 
typical express preemption clause, but should be imderstood as a 
canon of construction which creates a presumption for preemption 
in contrast to the normal predisposition against preemption; 
consequently, section 514 is not to be read alone but must be 
viewed in the context of the rest of ERISA. 
On the subjects where ERISA affirmatively legislates, e.g., 
the administration of employee benefit plans, the fiduciary 
standards governing such plans, the substantive rules for pension 
plans, this approach raises the normal questions for implied 
preemption—Is there conflict between state law and ERISA? 
Does ERISA fully occupy the field to the exclusion of state law?— 
but reads section 514(a) as establishing a rebuttable presumption 
for preemption. 
On the employee benefit subjects where ERISA does not 
legislate, i.e., as to the content of welfare plans, this approach 
construes section 514(a) as establishing a zone of employer 
autonomy, free of state and federal regulation. This zone is 
defined by analogizing from the topics which ERISA legislates as 
to pensions but not welfare arrangements. 
The reasoned textualist approach requires judicial judgments, 
some close and difficult; nevertheless, under this approach the 
statute shapes the inquiry and molds the outcomes since a 
predisposition to find preemption (while less expansive than the 
capacious test of the S/zow-based case law) defines the import of 
the statute more broadly, leading to more conflict between state 
and federal law, greater field occupation, and, ultimately, more 
preemption than under normal preemption standards. This 
reasoned textualist approach suggests skepticism of Travelers since 
a searching reading of section 514 indicates that (contra Travelers) 
that section is more than a codification of the Court's normal 
implied preemption standards. On the other hand, my approach 
suggests a narrower range of ERISA preemption than does Shaw 
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and, in particular, suggests that, under ERISA as it now exists, 
states can regulate HMOs and similar managed care providers and 
furnish tort remedies against them even when such providers are 
engaged by ERISA plans. 
I advance my analysis in five steps. Part I of this Article 
reviews the explicit statutory basis for ERISA preemption, section 
514, and discusses the three stage inquiry mandated by that 
section. Part II then explores the Court's initial case law based 
upon the capacious interpretation of section 514(a) announced in 
Shaw and follows that case law chronologically through the end of 
the Shaw line. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board 
of TradeJ Part III of this Article discusses the Court's new 
jurisprudence of ERISA preemption announced in Travelers? 
While the Court has so far declined to acknowledge the extent to 
which Travelers departs from the Shaw framework. Travelers 
replaces the expansive Shaw approach of near automatic 
preemption with the Court's traditional presumption against the 
displacement of state law, while simultaneously subjecting certain 
areas, previously litigated tmder the Shaw framework, to more 
stringent (though undefined) preemption. This third section 
argues that Travelers, while implicitly acknowledging the problems 
of the Shaw approach, is itself flawed. The Travelers framework 
gives inadequate substance to the terminology of section 514 which 
commands something more than the Court's normal preemption 
doctrine with its predisposition against preemption; moreover, the 
Travelers formula is an ambiguous and unconvincing method of 
preserving prior case law while simultaneously repudiating the 
Shaw approach on which that case law is based. 
Part IV of this Article outlines the reasoned textualist 
approach and applies it to the Shaw and Travelers case law; in 
many cases, the reasoned textualist approach preserves the Shaw-
based case law better than does Travelers-, indeed, this approach 
provides a more convincing explanation for the results in Travelers 
than does Travelers itself; when the reasoned textualist vantage 
produces different results than Shaw, that difference is for the 
better. 
In particular. Part IV addresses the questions which have 
recently occupied the attention of the courts, commentators, and 
Congress: Does ERISA section 514 preempt state law tort actions 
for medical malpractice and similar injury? Can the states, 
consistent with ERISA, regulate HMOs and similar health care 
providers? I conclude that section 514 does not preempt state law 
' 506 U.S. 125 (1992). 
8 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
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tort actions against service providers hired by employer-sponsored 
plans though it does preempt when the plan itself furnishes 
services. I similarly conclude that the states can, consistent with 
ERISA, regulate HMOs and other health care providers even 
when they furnish services to employer plans. These conclusions 
emerge from a more searching analysis of the relevant statutory 
text, suggesting that the problem to date has not been a surfeit of 
textualism in the context of ERISA preemption, but an incomplete 
engagement with the statute. 
Moreover, this analysis suggests that the proposed Dingell-
Norwood modifications to section 514, passed by the House of 
Representatives' and intended to narrow the scope of ERISA 
preemption vis-a-vis HMOs and other managed care providers, 
may, in the context of the reasoned textualist approach, be 
superfluous. Indeed, in some instances, Dingell-Norwood's 
preemption provisions, if enacted into law, would paradoxically 
reduce the tort liabilities of HMOs and other managed care 
entities in comparison with their liabilities under the reasoned 
textualist interpretation of section 514. 
Part V places my analysis in several contexts. Among my 
other assessments, I conclude that, while a reasoned textualist 
approach can make section 514 more workable. Congress should, 
as a matter of policy, repeal section 514, thus permitting ERISA 
preemption to be governed by the Court's normal standards of 
implied preemption. 
I. THE STATUTE 
As has been widely noted,^" ERISA governs two types of 
employer-provided fringe benefit plans, but treats them 
dissimilarly. ERISA covers both employer-provided deferred 
compensation arrangements, denoted in the statute as pension 
plans,^^ and employer-provided health, disability, and similar 
' The Dingell-Norwood legislation, entitled the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care 
Improvement Act of 1999," constitutes sections 1001-1601 of House Bill 2990, passed by 
the House in the first session of the 106th Congress. See H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. § 1302 
(1999) (modifying ERISA preemption). 
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT LAW 79 (2d ed. 1995). 
" See ERISA § 3(2)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974). ERISA consists of two types of 
provisions, tax provisions governing qualified plans as part of the Internal Revenue Code 
and labor provisions codified as part of the federal labor statutes. Sometimes, these 
provisions overlap, indeed, are identical. In this Article, I follow convention by 
referencing ERISA's labor sections to their original (uncodified) designation in ERISA 
itself while referencing ERISA's tax provisions to their current Internal Revenue Code 
designations. 
812 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:807 
programs, denoted as welfare plans.^^ In some areas, ERISA 
subjects both kinds of plans to the same statutory provisions. In 
particular, ERISA mandates for both pension and welfare plans 
the same obligations to report to the government and to plan 
participants,^^ identical fiduciary responsibilities for those 
managing plans and plan assets,^"* and the same judicial and 
administrative remedies for such plans and those interested in 
them.^' However, ERISA subjects pension arrangements, but not 
welfare plans, to elaborate statutory provisions governing the 
substantive content of such deferred compensation schemes." 
These rules govern, inter alia, who must participate in pension 
plans and when, the rates at which benefits and contributions must 
accrue and vest, the nondiscriminatory nature of benefits and 
contributions, and a variety of features about plan distributions. 
In contrast, ERISA does not regulate the substance of welfare 
plans. Viewed more affirmatively," ERISA provides, as to the 
substance of welfare arrangements, for employer autonomy." 
At the end of the legislative process finalizing the bills which 
became ERISA, the Conference Committee added section 514 
which provides that, as to pension and welfare plans covered by 
ERISA," ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any" such plans.^" Excepted 
from this preemptive rule are state insurance, banking, and 
securities laws,^^ as well as states' "generally applicable criminal 
law[s]."^^ However, the states may not deem ERISA-covered 
plans to be insurance companies, subject to state insurance 
12 See id. § 3(1), at 833. 
13 See id. §§ 101-111, at 840-52. 
" See id. §§ 401-414, at 874-90. 
13 See id. §§ 501-515, at 891-97. 
16 See id. §§ 201-308, at 852-74. 
1' Most commentators criticize ERISA's failure to regulate the substance of welfare 
arrangements. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 3, at 37 ("ERISA preemption has created an 
enormous, unanticipated 'regulatory vacuum.'"); Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss 
Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining The Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 243 (1997) (criticizing "ERISA's regulatory void with respect to 
welfare plans"). 
1^ In the case of collectively-bargained welfare plans, ERISA's policy of non-
regulation is more appropriately characterized as employer/union autonomy since the 
substance of such plans is determined through labor/management negotiations. The term 
"employer autonomy," as I use it throughout this Article, should be imderstood as 
including such employer/union autonomy. 
1' Among the plans not subject to ERISA are most governmental and church plans. 
See ERISA § 4(b), 88 Stat. 829, 839-40 (1974). 
20 Id. § 514(a), at 897. 
21 See id. § 514(b)(2)(A), at 897. 
22 Id. § 514(b)(4), at 897. 
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regulation?^ 
Thus, as a statutory matter, section 514 requires an analysis 
which can involve as many as three steps. In the face of the 
contention that ERISA preempts a state law, the first step under 
section 514 is to determine whether the particular state law 
"relate[s] to" ERISA plans?" if not, the ERISA preemption 
inquiry under section 514 ends and the state law survives scrutiny 
under section 514.^^ If, on the other hand, the state law in question 
"relate[s] to" ERISA arrangements, that law is preempted unless 
it falls within one of the four protected categories.^® Thus, the 
second step under section 514 is to decide if the challenged state 
law, while relating to ERISA plans, is protected by one of these 
statutory categories; if the state law falls outside all of the 
protected categories, the statutory inquiry ends with the state law 
preempted per section 514; if, however, the state law falls within 
one of the protected categories other than insurance law, the 
section 514 inquiry ends with the law protected from section 
514(a)'s mandate to preempt.^^ If the state law is shielded from 
ERISA preemption by virtue of the law's status as an insurance 
provision, the third and final step under section 514's "deemer 
clause" is to determine whether the statute affects only genuine 
insurance companies; if so, the state regulation survives ERISA 
preemption under section 514;^ if, in contrast, the state insurance 
rule reaches ERISA plans only by deeming such plans to be 
insurance companies, the protection for state insurance laws 
evaporates and the state law is preempted under section 514. 
While some have labeled section 514 an accommodation of 
fairly narrow interests,^' a chief sponsor of ERISA, in language 
subsequently much-quoted,^" hailed section 514 as ERISA's 
"crowning achievement,"^" freeing interstate employers from 
conflicting state regulation. 
" See id. § 514(b)(2)(B), at 897. 
2"' See id. (preempting state laws that "may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan"). 
However, a state law, while immune from preemption under section 514, might still 
be preempted under the Court's normal implied preemption doctrine. See infra notes 51-
55 and accompanying text. 
2' The four protected categories are banking, securities, insurance, and general 
criminal laws. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
2' Note, again, that the state law, while immune from preemption under section 514, 
might still be preempted under the Court's normal rules of implied preemption. See infra 
notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
2® Again, the state law, while not stricken per section 514, may be preempted under the 
Court's normal preemption doctrine. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
2' See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 10, at 418-23. 
2" See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 17, at 272-73. 
31 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent). 
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One possible approach^^ to section 514 is to understand it as 
codifying the Court's existing preemption doctrine. Ultimately, 
however, that characterization of section 514 is unconvincing. To 
those embracing traditional legislative history, the comments with 
which section 514 was unveiled to the House and Senate are strong 
evidence that those who crafted section 514 thought they were 
doing more than merely codifying the Court's preemption 
doctrine, doctrine which the Court would have applied even if 
there had been no section 514. 
Even to those more skeptical of such history, it is hard, as a 
textual matter, to view section 514 as incorporating the Court's 
prevailing preemption standards when, without section 514, the 
Court would have applied those standards anyway. Moreover, if 
section 514(a) merely codifies the Court's normal preemption 
rules, it is difficult to explain the provisions of section 514 which 
exempt from ERISA preemption state insurance, banking, 
securities, and criminal laws. If section 514(a) merely embodies 
normal preemption standards, these exemptions are, from a 
textual perspective, most plausibly read as reducing the level of 
preemption in these earmarked areas below such normal 
standards. Ironically, under this reading, section 514 becomes an 
anti-preemption provision, its only practical effect to exempt state 
insurance, banking, securities, and criminal laws from normal 
preemption scrutiny. 
Indeed, these exemptions represent a critical textual feature^^ 
of the statute, as section 514's protection for state banking, 
securities, insurance, and criminal laws indicates that there is 
something from which such laws are being protected. That, in 
turn, implies that section 514(a) must embody more than the 
Court's usual preemption standards. Thus, the more compelling 
construction of the text is that ERISA's drafters provided for 
greater than normal preemption in section 514(a), but protected 
the specified categories of state laws from this increased scrutiny, 
relegating them to normal preemption standards. 
Finally, from a textual perspective, it is instructive to compare 
Justices Scalia and Stevens have been most outspoken in urging this approach. The 
Court's new case law under Travelers largely, but incompletely, adopts this approach, 
embracing the normal presumption against preemption but nevertheless preserving prior 
case law inconsistent with that presumption. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying 
text. 
33 As is discussed infra note 118 and accompanying text, another major textual feature 
of section 514 is that it provides a single standard for all non-exempted state laws, i.e., 
"any and all" such state laws are preempted. ERISA § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974). 
Nevertheless, Travelers establishes a two-tiered scheme of preemption scrutiny, even 
though there is no basis for such a scheme in the statute. 
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the narrower preemption provisions in the bills passed by the 
House and Senate with section 514 as it emerged from the 
Conference Committee and ultimately became law.^'* Since these 
rejected texts come much closer to embodying normal preemption 
principles, it is hard to read the broader language of section 514(a) 
as doing the same. 
II. Shaw AND ITS PROGENY; NEAR AUTOMATIC PREEMPTION 
The Court's initiaP' approach to section 514(a) was 
formulated in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.^'' In Shaw, New York 
law mandated pregnancy-based disability payments for employees 
when federal law did not.^^ In a statement which articulated the 
essence of the Court's original jurisprudence of ERISA 
preemption, the Court declared that it had: 
[N]o difficulty in concluding that the [New York] Human 
Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law "relate to" employee 
benefit plans. The breadth of § 514(a)'s pre-emptive reach is 
apparent from that section's language. A law "relates to" an 
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it 
has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Employing 
this definition, the Human Rights Law, which prohibits 
employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a 
manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, and the 
Disability Benefits Law, which requires employers to pay 
employees specific benefits, clearly "relate to" benefit plans. 
We must give effect to this plain language unless there is good 
reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some 
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 n.l9 (1982). 
35 Decisions prior to Shaw had mentioned section 514(a), and one of them, Alessi v. 
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), had reached the merits. However, Alessi 
avoided the more difficult issues lurking in section 514. In Alessi, injured employees 
challenged provisions in their employers' pension plans which integrated, i.e., reduced, 
pension benefits by the amount of workers' compensation payments received by these 
employees. A New Jersey statute explicitly outlawed this practice. The Court held the 
New Jersey law preempted imder section 514 and thus sustained the integration formulas 
of the employers' plans and the consequent reduction of pension benefits to offset 
workers' compensation payments. See id. at 526. 
Much of the Alessi Court's analysis is compatible with traditional preemption 
doctrine, although the Court did not characterize it as such. ERISA specifically permits 
the integration of pension benefits with social security payments; the Treasury regulations 
implementing ERISA extend the scope of permitted integration to reductions for other 
kinds of payments such as workers' compensation. Even without section 514, the Court 
could plausibly have viewed federal regulation as occupying the field and as conflicting so 
clearly with the New Jersey statute as to preempt it. Instead, the Court found the New 
Jersey statute "relate[d] to" ERISA-covered pension plans and therefore superseded. Id. 
36 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
3' See id. at 89. 
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more restrictive meaning.^® 
In what became an equally important statement (albeit tucked 
away in a footnote), the Court indicated that, in particular settings, 
there would indeed be good reason for restricting the literal 
application of the "relate to" language: some state laws might 
"affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral a manner to warrant" preemption.^' 
In retrospect, the problems of the Shaw framework seem self-
evident: on the one hand, the Shaw Court declared the "relate to" 
standard an easily applied and expansive term without discernible 
limits, i.e., if a state law "has a connection with" an ERISA-
covered plan, section 514(a) applies. Under this understanding of 
the statute, ERISA preemption is nearly automatic whenever 
section 514 is invoked. On the other hand, the Court 
acknowledged that there must be some boundaries to the reach of 
ERISA preemption. Presumably, a plan trustee double parked for 
a meeting with his fellow trustees cannot defend against a traffic 
ticket on the ground that he was engaged in the business of an 
ERISA-regulated plan. Even acknowledging the inherent 
imprecision of inquiries of this sort, the Shaw approach to section 
514(a) provides little (if any) useful guidance as to where ERISA 
preemption ends. 
However, my instinct is to be more charitable in assessing 
retrospectively the handiwork of the Shaw Court; hindsight, as 
they say, is always 20/20. Moreover, in 1983 few could have 
prophesied the factors which would later make the Shaw test so 
unsatisfactory: the explosive growth of employer-provided medical 
outlays, the consequent rise of managed care, the determination of 
the states to regulate such care. In addition, the outcome in Shaw 
was reasonably benign; for years subsequent to those at issue in 
Shaw, federal law had outlawed pregnancy-based discrimination 
prospectively; thus, declaring New York law preempted in 
practical terms had only retroactive effect for prior years."" 
Finally, the Shaw Court may have been led astray by the 
usually helpful distinction between express and implied 
preemption."^ When a federal statute explicitly provides for 
preemption, that preemption provision is typically a reasonably 
self-contained expression of policy, minimizing, if not eliminating, 
the need for extensive analysis of the rest of the statute to see if 
Id. at 96-97 (footnotes omitted). 
39 /d.atl00n.21. 
"0 See id. at 89-90. 
''3 See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State 
Tort Remedies, 11 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997). 
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the statute conflicts with state law or occupies the field to the 
exclusion of state law."^ In contrast, implicit preemption, by 
definition, depends upon such an analysis of the statute to discern 
conflict or preemptive occupation of the field. As I suggest below, 
the most workable reading of section 514 is as something of a 
hybrid, using elements of both approaches, placing section 514(a) 
alongside the relevant provisions of the statute and treating that 
section as a canon of construction which creates a presumption for 
preemption. 
However, the Shaw Court plausibly, if ultimately mistakenly, 
approached section 514(a) as a typical explicit preemption 
provision, more or less capable of application independently from 
the rest of ERISA and the implied preemption inquiries of conflict 
and field preemption. 
The Court's next ERISA preemption case. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,^^ reaffirmed the Shaw test which 
the Court used to conclude that a Massachusetts insurance law 
mandating mental health coverage in group insurance contracts 
relates to welfare plans for purposes of section 514(a). The 
Massachusetts statute, the Court decided, had "a connection with 
or reference to" employers' health plans, "indirectly but 
substantially," since the statute required such plans "to purchase 
the mental-health benefits specified in the statute when they 
purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy.'""* In the 
second step of its analysis, the Court found the Massachusetts law, 
while related to ERISA plans, nevertheless saved from 
preemption as an exempted insurance statute. 
For purposes of the present discussion, two aspects of 
Metropolitan Life are noteworthy. First, only after determining 
that the Massachusetts statute relates to welfare plans for purposes 
of section 514(a) did the Court employ the normal presumption 
"that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state 
regulation.'"*^ Thus, the Court utilized the presumption against 
preemption not in applying section 514(a) and the relate-to 
standard, but only in the second stage of the section 514 inquiry, 
when the Court turned to the insurance exemption from ERISA 
preemption. This approach contrasts markedly with the Court's 
new jurisprudence of ERISA which deploys the presumption 
Compare ERISA § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974), with the explicit preemption 
provision of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 
("USERRA"). See USERRA § 4302,108 Stat. 3150 (1994). 
« 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
Id. at 739 (citations omitted). 
« Id. at 740. 
818 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:807 
against preemption at the first step of the analysis, i.e., when 
determining whether a state law relates to ERISA plans for 
purposes of section 514(a). 
Second, the Court found that the Massachusetts statute 
related to employer health plans by "indirectly but substantially'"*® 
affecting employers' choices in the marketplace: under the 
Massachusetts statute, an employer is forced either to self-fund its 
employees' health benefits or to purchase insurance providing 
mandated mental health benefits; as a result of the state statute, 
the employer is deprived of the option of insuring health benefits 
for its employees sans mental health coverage. The Court's new 
jurisprudence, in contrast, dismisses such constrictions of employer 
choices as indirect and, as such, not triggering section 514(a).'*^ 
Many have criticized Metropolitan Life for the dichotomy 
between insured plans (indirectly subject to state supervision via 
the states' regulation of insurance policies) and self-funded plans 
(free of state regulation by virtue of ERISA preemption).'*® 
However, the Court's response to this criticism was (and remains) 
sound: the distinction between insured and noninsured plans is not 
of the Court's making, but is in the statute, namely, section 514's 
exemption for state laws regulating insurance. 
The more serious problem with Metropolitan Life is that it 
solidified the Court's commitment to the Shaw understanding of 
the relate-to test; because of section 514's exemption for state 
insurance laws, the Massachusetts statute (while relating to 
ERISA-covered plans) was ultimately saved from preemption 
since it is an insurance law."' It is, however, interesting to 
speculate whether, in the absence of the insurance exemption, the 
Metropolitan Life Comt would have perceived the Shaw approach 
as going too far. Suppose, for example, that there were no 
insurance exception in section 514 and that the Court had in 
Metropolitan Life stricken the Massachusetts statute mandating 
mental health benefits as that law applied to ERISA plans. How 
far would the Court have been willing to apply this (hypothetical) 
Metropolitan Life opinion? If, for example, an ERISA-covered 
health plan of a Massachusetts employer desired to purchase 
insurance from a carrier unlicensed to do business in 
Massachusetts, would section 514 have preempted Massachusetts 
from forbidding a relationship between the unlicensed insurer and 
Id. at 739. 
See discussion of Travelers infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text. 
See, e.g., LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 10, at 444-45. 
Section 514's exception for state insurance laws raises its own interpretative issues. 
See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 119 S. Ct. 1380 (1999). 
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the ERISA plan? The only doctrinal tool in the Shaw toolkit to 
avoid this outcome would have been to characterize 
Massachusetts's prohibition on unlicensed insurers as "remote," 
"tenuous," or "peripheral" to ERISA plans,'" not a terribly 
convincing notion when state law simply forbids a plan from 
contracting with a desired service provider because the provider is 
unlicensed. 
Perhaps, confronted with these possibilities, the Court would 
have recoiled in Metropolitan Life, as it later did in Travelers, 
seeing that Shaw's capacious approach of near automatic 
preemption could lead to undesirable places. However, section 
514's exemption for state insurance laws precluded the Court from 
having to face these possibilities; the Shaw standard thus looked 
manageable since, in the final analysis, the Massachusetts statute 
was sustained. 
In contrast, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,^^ the Shaw 
formula had a more pronounced impact, i.e., the denial to the 
aggrieved participant of his state law remedies. Moreover, 
Dedeaux was the first decision in which the Court found implied 
preemptive force in an ERISA provision other than section 514. 
Dedeaux was insured under an employer-provided group disability 
policy. After Dedeaux was injured, the carrier and Dedeaux 
disagreed about his eligibility for benefits. Dedeaux then sued the 
carrier pursuant to several tort theories available under Mississippi 
law. 
Relying again on the Shaw formulation of the relate-to test, 
the Court found that Dedeaux's state law tort claims had "a 
connection with or reference to" his employer's ERISA-covered 
plan providing disability benefits on an insured basis.'^ Since these 
claims did not constitute insurance regulation within the meaning 
of section 514, they were preempted as relating to an ERISA plan 
of employer-provided welfare benefits. 
In retrospect, Dedeaux was a lost opportunity to examine the 
relationship between section 514(a) and the rest of ERISA. As a 
result, Dedeaux was also a turning point (not fully appreciated at 
the time) in expanding the impact of ERISA preemption from 
employer plans to the service providers engaged by those plans. In 
Dedeaux, the Solicitor General, appearing amicus curiae, urged 
the Court to hold section 502, EMSA's claims provision, the 
exclusive set of remedies against ERISA plans." The Court 
Shaw V. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,100 n.21 (1983). 
51 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
52 Id. at 47 (citations omitted). 
53 See id. at 52. 
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agreed, declaring that "the detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth 
a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme" that had its own "pre­
emptive force" vis-a-vis state law remedies.^" 
This formulation raises a question which the Court did not 
address: if section 502 (and, by extension, other provisions of 
ERISA) on their own preempt conflicting state law, what is the 
function of section 514?^' Or, to reframe the inquiry, if section 
514(a) explicitly governs ERISA's preemptive effect, what role is 
left for the Court's implicit preemption doctrine? 
Moreover, Dedeaux involved an employee's lawsuit not 
against his employer's medical plan, but against a service provider 
hired by the plan, i.e., an insurance carrier. Under the expansive 
Shaw approach to section 514(a), the distinction between lawsuits 
against plans and actions against such service providers is of no 
moment, since a claim against a service provider has "a connection 
with" the plan and is, per Shaw, preempted. However, as I discuss 
below,'® a careful reading of section 502, in the context of the 
ERISA provisions touching upon service providers, highlights the 
distinction between plans (subject to extensive ERISA regulation) 
and the service providers engaged by plans (not subject to such 
regulation). The distinction between plans and service providers 
proves important when we turn to the current controversy about 
ERISA preemption, the state tort law liability of service providers 
like managed care organizations, and the states' legal ability to 
regulate such organizations." 
Section 514's relationship with the rest of ERISA, as well as 
the capaciousness of the Shaw standard, are central to Mackey v. 
Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,^^ a case which, for the 
first time in the ERISA preemption setting, divided the Court." In 
Mackey, a collection agency sought to satisfy judgments by 
garnisWg amounts owed to workers by a vacation pay plan, an 
ERISA-covered welfare arrangement.®" A specific Georgia statute 
prohibited the garnishment of welfare plan benefits; the Court 
easily and unanimously foimd this statute preempted. The Court 
had greater difficulty determining whether ERISA preempted 
5" Id. at 54. 
My answer starts with the xmcertainty of determining whether state and federal law 
conflict or whether Congress has occupied the relevant field. Section 514(a) is best 
understood as shaping the inquiry by creating a presumption for preemption in contrast to 
the traditional presumption against preemption. 
5' See discussion infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text. 
5^ See infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text. 
58 486 U.S. 825 (1988). 
5' Until Mackey, the Court's preemption decisions had been unanimous. 
«> See ERISA § 3(1), 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974). 
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Georgia's general garnishment statute insofar as judgment 
creditors sought to use such statute to reach welfare plan benefits. 
In Mackey, a five-Justice majority found against such 
preemption. Critical to the majority's reasoning was the need for a 
mechanism to enforce judgments against ERISA plans, if a plan 
has liability under section 502 which it refuses to pay or if a plan 
has liability from "run-of-the-mill state-law claims such as unpaid 
rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an 
ERISA plan."®^ Since ERISA does not provide a device to enforce 
judgments against recalcitrant plans, it is necessary in such cases to 
utilize state law procedures such as Georgia's general garnishment 
statute. 
Of equal concern to the Court's majority was ERISA section 
206(d), which specifically requires pension plans to contain 
spendthrift clauses protecting pension benefits from aUenation and 
assignment. To construe section 514(a) as accomplishing the same 
protection for welfare arrangements (via the preemption of state 
garnishment laws), would, the majority reasoned, render section 
206(d) redundant.® 
The four member minority viewed the majority's concern 
about the enforcement of judgments against plans as irrelevant to 
Mackey, since Mackey involved a garnishment order requiring a 
welfare plan to retain the funds owed to a participant to satisfy the 
participant's debt, not an order against the plan to collect money 
owed by the plan on its own behalf. As to section 206(d), the 
minority acknowledged the redundancy problem, but countered 
that the majority (by upholding state garnishment laws as applied 
to welfare programs) was rendering redundant section 514(b)(7). 
That provision, adopted by Congress in 1984, saves from ERISA 
preemption state law garnishments to enforce certain "qualified 
domestic relations orders."® Unless section 514(a) generally 
preempts state garnishment laws, the minority reasoned, it was 
unnecessary for section 514(b)(7) to save such laws from 
preemption in the context of qualified domestic relations orders. 
Mackey and the division in the Mackey Court highlight the 
problematic nature of the Shaw relate-to standard. In the final 
analysis, neither the Mackey majority nor the minority relied on 
section 514(a) or Shaw to resolve the case, but invoked other 
Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833. Presumably, the torts being referred to are not the kinds of 
tort claims which Dedeaux held preempted by sections 502 and 514. 
As I note infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text, a different understanding is that 
section 206(d) requires employers to include spendthrift clauses in pension plans; welfare 
plans are free to include such clauses or not. 
« 18 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1994). 
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provisions of ERISA—sections 206(d), 502, and 514(b)(7)—to 
answer the preemption inquiry. But that approach begs a central 
question under the statute: if the provisions of ERISA, by virtue of 
their detailed and comprehensive nature, override state law as a 
matter of implied preemption, what is the meaning of section 514 
and its explicit preemption mandate? 
A second notable aspect of Mackey is the majority's effort to 
reformulate the outer boundary of ERISA preemption. 
Eschewing the Shaw Court's formula of that boundary ("tenuous, 
remote, or peripheral"),®" the Mackey Court denoted as "run-of-
the-mill"®® those state laws beyond the scope of section 514(a) and 
its relate-to standard. This reformulation of the outer bounds of 
ERISA preemption is ultimately no more helpful than the Shaw 
test it supplements, suggesting the difficulties of finding limits 
under Shaw's capacious understanding of the statute's "relate to" 
terminology. 
The Court's unanimity essentially reappeared in EMC Corp. 
V. Holliday,^ when the Court held a Pennsylvania anti-subrogation 
statute preempted as it would have applied to employers' self-
funded medical plans. In EMC, an employee's child was injured in 
an automobile accident; the employer's self-funded medical plan 
paid a portion of the child's medical bills. The employee sued the 
driver on his child's behalf and obtained a settlement. The plan 
then sought reimbursement from the settlement proceeds pursuant 
to a subrogation clause in the plan. The employee resisted, citing a 
Pennsylvania statute outlawing subrogation as to motor vehicle 
tort recoveries. The Court found the Pennsylvania statute 
protecting such recoveries ERISA-preempted, thus permitting the 
plan to enforce its subrogation provision and obtain 
reimbursement for its outlay from the settlement proceeds. 
The EMC Court began its analysis with the by-now familiar 
Shaw test: the Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law related to an 
employee benefit plan because it had "a connection with or 
reference to such a plan."®^ The Court buttressed this conclusion 
by noting the importance of ERISA preemption in establishing 
national uniformity: if Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation policy 
stood as to ERISA plans, an interstate employer would be 
required to calculate benefit levels differently in Pennsylvania than 
in other states permitting subrogation.®^ 
Shaw V. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,100 n.21 (1983). 
« Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833. 
498 U.S. 52 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Id. at 58 (citation omitted). 
See id. at 60. 
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The Court acknowledged that the Pennsylvania anti-
subrogation statute passed muster as an insurance law; however, 
Pennsylvania cannot deem self-funded plans to be insurance 
carriers. Hence, as to the self-funded EMC plan, ERISA 
precluded Pennsylvania from applying its anti-subrogation statute. 
In interpreting section 514 in this manner, the EMC Court 
acknowledged "the presumption that Congress does not intend to 
pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation."® Again, however, 
the Court did not deploy this presumption at the first step in the 
section 514 analysis, i.e., in determining whether the Pennsylvania 
anti-subrogation statute relates to welfare plans, but only after that 
inquiry was completed and the analysis moved to the second and 
third steps of applying the insurance exemption and the deemer 
clause. 
In contrast. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in EMC, would 
have used the presumption against preemption at the first stage of 
the section 514 analysis and would have found, on that basis, that 
the Pennsylvania statute did not relate to welfare plans within the 
meaning of section 514(a)—a position close to that ultimately 
adopted by the Court in Travelers. 
At one level, the Court's next ERISA preemption decision, 
Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon^^ resembled its earlier 
pronouncement in Dedeaux. Like Dedeaux, Ingersoll-Rand 
involved a plan participant who sued in state court under a tort 
theory. In Ingersoll-Rand, the participant was apparently'^ fired 
months before vesting in his employer's qualified deferred 
compensation plan. The participant claimed that he had been 
terminated to prevent such vesting and that, as a matter of state 
law, this termination constituted tortious conduct by the employer. 
A divided Texas Supreme Court agreed, recognizing a state law 
tort when employers fire employees to minimize employers' 
pension costs. 
The United States Supreme Court subsequently held the 
Texas tort preempted, explicitly by section 514(a) and implicitly by 
ERISA's remedy provisions. The Court easily and unanimously 
found that the Texas tort relates to the employer's ERISA-
regulated pension plan since, under the Texas court's analysis. 
Id. at 62. 
™ See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). But this position is not identical since Travelers effectively 
provides tougher scrutiny of certain state laws. See discussion infra notes 117-19 and 
accompanying text. 
•" 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 
Neither the fired participant nor his former employer seems to have initially 
recognized that the participant indeed did have sufficient service to vest. 
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"there simply is no cause of action if there is no plan.'"^ 
Moreover, six of the nine Justices^" also held that ERISA's 
remedy provisions preempt the Texas tort under principles of 
implied "conflict pre-emption.'"' ERISA section 510 proscribes 
pension-motivated firings; ERISA section 502 (also central to the 
Court's analysis in Dedeaux) authorizes a federal cause of action 
to enforce employees' ERISA rights. Together, the six Justices 
concluded, these provisions provide the employee with his 
exclusive remedy, by implication preempting any state law cause 
of action. 
Like Dedeaux, Ingersoll-Rand leaves unexamined the 
relationship between section 514(a) and implied preemption 
analysis: If provisions of ERISA other than section 514(a) displace 
state law under the Court's traditional implied preemption 
doctrine, what is the role of section 514(a) and its explicit 
statement of ERISA preemption? If section 514(a) reaches 
beyond that doctrine, striking state laws which would otherwise 
survive the Court's regular approach to implicit preemption, it is 
irrelevant that, absent section 514(a), ERISA would preempt some 
state laws anyway.'' On the other hand, reading section 514(a) as 
coterminous with the Court's standard implied preemption 
analysis renders that section superfluous. 
There is, moreover, a difference between Dedeaux and 
Ingersoll-Rand which, while logically ignored under Shaw, 
becomes critical under a more searching reading of the statute: 
Dedeaux was an action against a service provider, in particular, the 
insurer hired by the employer's medical plan; Ingersoll-Rand, in 
contrast, was an action against an employer. If, per Shaw, the test 
for preemption is whether a claim has "a connection with" an 
ERISA plan, both kinds of actions are properly viewed as 
preempted. If, however, the entire text of ERISA is considered," 
ERISA treats employers differently from service providers, 
regulating extensively the former but not the latter. As I argue 
below, it is consequently appropriate to read ERISA's remedies as 
occupying the field as to employer misbehavior, but not as 
occupying the field vis-a-vis service providers and their relations 
with plan participants. 
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140. 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens expressed no opinion on this subject. 
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 145. 
This perspective buttresses the decision of the three Justices who joined Ingersoll-
Rand to the extent it struck the Texas tort under section 514(a), but who did not join the 
Court's discussion of traditional conflict preemption and sections 502 and 510, as, from 
this perspective, the latter discussion was dicta. 
'''' See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text. 
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John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust and 
Savings BanE^ again explored the relationship among ERISA 
preemption, the Court's regular preemption doctrine, and section 
514's exception for state insurance laws. While the issues in John 
Hancock were quite technical, at its core, the John Hancock 
controversy was about the employer's ability to utilize funds an 
insurance company held for the employer's qualified plan. If the 
funds were characterized as normal insurance reserves, the 
employer had to prove its entitlement to those funds under 
contract, tort, or insurance law theories; on the other hand, if the 
funds held by the insurer were properly classified as assets of the 
employer's plan and if the insurer was also a fiduciary with respect 
to these funds, the insurer's handling of these funds was subject to 
the higher standards of ERISA's fiduciary rules which forbid self-
interested behavior by the insurer as fiduciary. This, in turn, made 
it easier for the employer to reach these funds since it was simpler 
for the employer to show self-interested behavior by the insurer 
than for the employer to demonstrate the employer's entitlement 
under contract, tort, or insurance law theories. 
In holding that the funds held by the insurer were indeed plan 
assets subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards, the Court, inter alia, 
rejected the insurer's contention that section 514's preservation of 
state insurance law effectively preempts federal law, awarding 
state insurance regulation exclusive jurisdiction over funds held by 
insurers, even for ERISA plans. In rejecting this approach, the 
John Hancock Court first noted that "[sjtate laws concerning an 
insurer's management of general account assets can 'relate to [an] 
employee benefit plan' and thus fall under the preemption clause 
[of section 514(a)], but they are also, in the words of the saving 
clause, laws 'which regulat[e] insurance.'"^' Moreover, the saving 
clause—section 514's exemption for state insurance laws—does 
not, the Court held, "alter ... preemption analysis."®" Thus, state 
insurance laws and federal laws affecting insurance co-exist with 
federal law preempting when the two conflict. 
As a construction of section 514, this analysis is compelling: 
section 514(a) and its "relate to" standard provide for more 
stringent preemption than does normal implied preemption 
analysis with its presumption against the displacement of state law; 
section 514's exemption provisions restore state insurance, 
banking, securities, and criminal laws to these traditional 
preemption standards, more solicitous of state law. This analysis 
'8 510 U.S. 86 (1993). 
" Id. at 99 (first and third alterations in original). 
80 Id. at 87. 
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also highlights the problem with the alternative view (subsequently 
embraced by the Court in Travelers) that section 514(a) merely 
embodies the conventional principles of implied preemption, in 
particular, the traditional presumption against preemption. Under 
that understanding of section 514(a), the exemption provisions are, 
as a textual matter, most plausibly read as reducing the quantum 
of federal preemption for the protected categories of state law 
below traditional levels of implied preemption scrutiny, effectively 
turning section 514 into an anti-preemption provision. 
The last of the Court's Shaw-hased preemption cases®^ was 
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,^^ in 
which the Court struck on preemption grounds a District of 
Columbia ("D.C.") statute which requires employers providing 
health insurance to furnish the same insurance to injured 
employees receiving workers' compensation. Labeling the Shaw 
approach to section 514(a) as "true to the ordinary meaning of 
'relate to,"'®^ the Court, summarizing the Shaw-hased case law, 
declared that section 514(a) preempts state laws even if such laws 
are "not specifically designed to affect"®" ERISA plans, even if the 
effect of state laws on ERISA arrangements "is only indirect,"®' 
and even if state laws are "consistent with ERISA's substantive 
requirements."®® Since the D.C. statute "specifically refers to 
welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA,"®'' i.e., the employer-
provided medical coverage which the statute extends to workers' 
compensation recipients, the statute is preempted by section 
514(a). 
To summarize: Shaw and its progeny, through Washington 
Board of Trade, understand section 514(a) capaciously. For the 
first stage of ERISA preemption analysis—determining whether a 
challenged state law "relates to" ERISA-covered plans—Shaw 
mandates an inquiry far more expansive than the Court's normal 
doctrine of implied preemption. While that implied preemption 
doctrine employs a presumption against preempting state law, 
Shaw goes well beyond a presumption in the opposite direction, 
making preemption nearly automatic. Under Shaw, any reference 
to or connection with an ERISA-regulated plan brings state law 
This is my characterization; the Court itself, as I discuss infra notes 100-20 and 
accompanying text, has been unwilling to acknowledge Travelers as commencing a new 
line of cases and thus recognize Washington Board of Trade as ending an old one. 
82 506 U.S. 125 (1992). 
83 Id. at 129. 
8'' Id. at 130 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,139 (1990)). 
88 Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139). 
8^ Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)). 
82 Id. 
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within the contours of section 514(a) and ERISA preemption. 
Only at the second stage of analysis (pertaining to state insurance, 
banking, securities, and criminal laws) does the Shaw case law 
resort to traditional, i.e., deferential, preemption standards since 
these laws are protected statutorily from the exacting scrutiny of 
section 514(a). 
The Court's Shaw-hased preemption case law does recognize 
that there must be limits to the sweep of section 514(a); however, 
the Court's efforts to define those limits ("remote," "peripheral," 
"tenuous," "run-of-the-mill")^® have not been successful. 
If the particular outcomes reached under the Shaw rubric 
were sometimes unpalatable for the Court, those results could 
nevertheless be explained as implementing Congress's explicit 
command to preempt state laws broadly when such laws relate to 
ERISA-covered plans. That congressional command could, in 
turn, be understood as mandating national uniformity and 
employer autonomy for pension and welfare programs, plausible 
policies albeit ones with their own costs. 
It was, however, inevitable that a case would come before the 
Court where a Shaw-based outcome would prove more troubling, 
a case which would finally cast the Shaw framework as the 
Godzilla of preemption, crushing everything in its path. 
III. AND THE NEW CASE LAW 
OF ERISA PREEMPTION 
The case which broke the Shaw framework was New York 
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Insurance Co.,®' which involved surcharges New York State 
imposes as part of its regulation of hospital rates. Under New 
York's regulatory scheme, hospitals charge patients covered by 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Medicaid, or an HMO only basic billing 
rates for their hospital stays.'" Other patients, e.g., those covered 
by commercial insurers, by self-insured funds, or by volunteer 
firefighter benefits, pay to the hospital an additional thirteen 
percent (13%) surcharge for their hospitalizations. Hospitalized 
patients covered by commercial insurance also pay a second 
surcharge of eleven percent (11%) which the hospital remits to the 
state.'^ 
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
89 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
90 These rates are based on 794 standard Diagnostic Related Groups. See id. at 649. 
91 New York also levies a direct surcharge on HMOs based on their respective monthly 
payments for members' hospital care; the amount of this surcharge varies with the HMOs' 
Medicaid enrollment but can reach a maximum of nine percent (9%) of the HMOs' 
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The obvious impact of these surcharges is to encourage 
employers to switch from commercial insurance and self-funding 
to Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage: a hospital bill of $200 for a 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield patient is, by virtue of the surcharge 
scheme, $226 for a patient participating in his employer's self-
funded plan and $248 for a patient serviced by commercial 
insurance. 
Applying the Shaw-hased case law, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 514(a) preempts 
this scheme of hospital surcharges;'^ indeed, under the Shaw 
framework. Travelers is a straightforward case. In Metropolitan 
Life, the Court, applying Shaw, held that the Massachusetts statute 
mandating mental health coverage in insurance policies relates to 
ERISA plans by constricting the choices confronting such plans: 
the Massachusetts statute forces employers providing medical 
benefits either to purchase insurance with mental health coverage 
or to self-fund; the state law denies employers the option of 
purchasing insurance without mental health benefits.'^ Thus, the 
Massachusetts statute, per Shaw, relates to employers' ERISA-
covered plans since the statute has a "connection with" such plans, 
i.e., an "indirect[] but substantia^]""* influence on employers' 
choices. The same is evidently true of the New York surcharge 
scheme.'' 
In Metropolitan Life, the state law which triggered section 
514(a) as relating to ERISA-covered plans ultimately avoided 
preemption because, at the second stage of analysis, the law fell 
within the protected category of insurance regulation. In contrast, 
the New York hospital surcharges do not come within any of the 
four exempted categories and thus, having triggered section 
514(a), are preempted under the Shaw framework. 
In the last case in the Shaw line, Washington Board of Trade, 
outlays for its members' hospital care. See id. at 650. 
'2 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993). 
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1984). 
Id. at 739. 
Arguably, employers' choices were more severely constricted in Metropolitan Life 
than in Travelers since the Massachusetts statute in Metropolitan Life absolutely prohibits 
insurance policies without mental health benefits; the New York surcharges, in contrast, 
do not ban self-funding or commercial insurance coverage, but penalize via higher 
effective hospital rates the employer's decision to self-fund medical coverage or to utilize 
commercial insurance rather than Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage. It is, however, 
difficult to discern in the Shaw approach a distinction between state laws which penalize 
particular employer choices and state laws which ban certain choices; both kinds of laws 
have a "connection with" employers' medical plans. Shaw defined the outer boundary of 
ERISA preemption as state laws having only "tenuous," "remote," or "peripheral" impact 
on ERlSA-regulated plans; a 24% cumulative surcharge on hospital rates is difficult to 
characterize in such terms. 
1999] ERISA PREEMPTION 829 
the Court, quite accurately summarizing the evolution of the Shaw 
relate-to test, reiterated that section 514 preempts state laws even 
if such laws are "not specifically designed to affect'"® ERISA 
plans, even if the effect of such laws on ERISA plans "is only 
indirect,'"^ and even if such state laws are "consistent with 
ERISA's substantive requirements.'"® Given that broad 
understanding of ERISA preemption as it had evolved under 
Shaw, it is not surprising that the Second Circuit held that section 
514(a) preempts New York's hospital surcharges." 
As is evident from the Supreme Court's opinion in Travelers, 
that conclusion was ultimately unacceptable to the Court. 
However questionable some of the results under the Shaw line 
might have been, the Court—until Travelers—viewed those results 
as mandated by the literal terms of the statute and as justified by 
reasonable policy rationales, principally, the need to free interstate 
employers from inconsistent state regulation of such employers' 
welfare plans. 
However, applying Shaw to New York's hospital surcharges 
would have effectively dismantled states' regulation of hospital 
rates, indeed, would potentially have destroyed all state regulation 
of medical care since roughly half of medical care in the United 
States is purchased via employer-provided plans.Under the 
capacious Shaw test of near automatic preemption, as originally 
formulated in Shaw and as applied by subsequent case law, 
virtually any state regulation of medical care relates to such plans, 
i.e., has a "connection with" them. Had the Court, per Shaw and 
its progeny, invalidated states' regulation of hospital fees as 
relating to employer-provided medical plans, no principle would 
have stopped preemption there. Rather, the invahdation of New 
York's hospital surcharges would logically have been the first step 
in dismantling the state law framework governing health care, 
heavily financed via ERISA-regulated plans. Finding this an 
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992) 
(quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,139 (1990)). 
" Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139). 
Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739). 
" While the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit nominally placed 
its primary reliance on Ingersoll-Rand, its analysis fits more comfortably with the facts and 
reasoning of Metropolitan Life. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 
1993) ("[T]he surctoges purposely interfere with the choices that ERISA plans make for 
health care coverage. Such interference is sufficient to constitute 'connection with' 
ERISA plans."). 
100 por a discussion of reasons for this, see Theodore R. Marmor & Michael S. Barr, 
Making Sense of the National Health Insurance Reform, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 228, 
256 (1992) ("liiere is very little evidence that Americans prefer the employer-based 
aspect of our present arrangements, rather than the tax-subsidy aspects of it."). 
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unacceptable result, the Supreme Court abandoned the Shaw 
framework, but in a fashion neither wholly candid nor wholly 
convincing. 
The Court bottomed its Travelers analysis upon the 
observation that preemption doctrine has traditionally begun with 
the "presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state 
law."'"' Moreover, if the critical phrase of section 514(a)—"relate 
to"—"were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its 
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would 
never run its course, for '[r]eally, universally, relations stop 
nowhere."""^ 
Had there been no Shaw line of cases, both of these 
pronouncements might have been unexceptionable; given the 
existence of Shaw and its progeny, both of these pronouncements 
are problematic: in the Shaw cases, the Court never deployed the 
traditional presumption against preemption at the first stage of the 
analysis, in determining whether a state law relates to ERISA 
plans for purposes of section 514(a). That presumption, when it 
enters the Shaw jurisprudence, enters only at the second stage, in 
applying the special exemptions for state banking, securities, 
insurance, and criminal laws. Moreover, the capacious Shaw 
test—if it does not extend to the furthest stretches of 
indeterminacy—comes fairly close, i.e., to the hard-to-define 
territory where state laws are too "remote," "tenuous," 
"peripheral," or "run-of-the-mill" to be preempted.'"^ It is, 
furthermore, difficult, as a textual matter, to view section 514 as a 
mere restatement of the Court's implied preemption doctrine with 
its predisposition against preemption.'"" 
Declaring the precise text of section 514(a) "unhelpful,"'"^ the 
Travelers Court turned its attention to the legislative purpose of 
ERISA preemption: "to avoid a multiplicity of [state] regulation in 
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee 
benefit plans.'""" Reviewing Shaw, EMC, and Ingersoll-Rand, the 
Travelers Court found that the state laws at issue in these cases 
"mandated employee benefit structures or their administration'""^ 
or provided "alternate enforcement mechanisms'""" and thus 
101 New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995). 
102 Id. at 655 (alteration in original)(citation omitted). 
101 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
10^ See discussion jupro notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
101 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 646. 
100 Id. 
102 Id. at 658. 
108 Id. 
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frustrated the policy of national uniformity. In contrast, the New 
York hospital surcharges merely have an "indirect economic effect 
on choices made by insurance buyers, including ERISA plans,"^*® 
making commercial insurance and self-funding less attractive than 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage; hence, no ERISA preemption. 
To buttress its conclusion sustaining New York's hospital 
surcharges, the Travelers Court noted that, if state laws are 
preempted because of their "indirect economic influence""" on 
ERISA plans, there is virtually no limit to the reach of such 
preemption. For example, states' "basic regulation of employment 
conditions will invariably affect the cost and price of [hospital] 
services.""^ However, the Court continued, it is unlikely that 
Congress intended for ERISA preemption to reach this far and 
thus "displace general health care regulation, which historically 
has been a matter of local concern.""^ 
Washington Board of Trade had recently and contrariwise 
reaffirmed that section 514(a) preempts laws affecting ERISA 
plans indirectly; indeed, the statute struck in Washington Board of 
Trade as ERISA-preempted regulated an area which "historically 
has been a matter of local concern""^—workers' compensation. In 
apparent recognition of this difficulty, the Travelers Court then 
took a final stab at its new standard for ERISA preemption: 
indirect effects will result in preemption if such effects are 
"acute.""'' New York's surcharges, however, do not fall within this 
category since "they affect only indirectly the relative prices of 
insurance policies, a result no different from myriad state laws in 
areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress 
could not possibly have intended to eliminate.'"" 
Of course, reasonable people can disagree whether a twenty-
four percent (24%) cumulative surcharge for commercially-
insured patients creates an "acute" effect. It is, however, beyond 
peradventure that the resulting test for ERISA preemption— 
whether a challenged state law creates an indirect, but acute, 
economic effect—cannot be found in Shaw or its progeny. 
Confronted with the unpalatable results to which Shaw was 
pointing—the progressive dismanthng of state regulation of 
medical care as preempted by ERISA—it is understandable that 
the Travelers Court reconsidered the Shaw framework. However, 
Id. at 646. 
"0 Id. at 659. 
"1 Id. at 660. 
"2 Id. at 661. 
"3 Id. 
Id. at 668. 
"5 Id. 
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for three reasons, Travelers is not a persuasive reading of section 
514. First, if, as Travelers indicates, section 514(a) merely 
embodies the Court's traditional standards of implied preemption, 
why did Congress bother enacting section 514? The Court's 
preemption doctrine is well-established"® part of the legal 
environment against which Congress enacted ERISA in 1974; had 
there been no section 514, the Court's normal implied preemption 
standards would, by default, have governed ERISA; there is no 
apparent reason why those who drafted section 514 would have 
felt compelled to restate prevailing preemption doctrine 
statutorily. 
Second, Travelers ignores the difficult textual problem 
presented by section 514's exemptions for state banking, securities, 
insurance, and criminal laws. If, as Travelers indicates, section 
514(a) incorporates a presumption against preemption, it is hard to 
see that from which these laws are exempted. Indeed, if section 
514(a) merely declares the Court's regular preemption doctrine 
with a predisposition against preemption, the four protected 
categories are, from a textual perspective, most plausibly read as 
removing state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal laws 
from standard preemption analysis, thereby relegating such laws to 
lower than normal levels of preemption scrutiny. Under this 
approach, section 514 becomes an anti-preemption provision—a 
result which is, at the least, counterintuitive. 
Finally, Travelers is internally inconsistent, proclaiming a 
presumption against preemption in ERISA cases while 
simultaneously preserving the Shaw-hased case law incompatible 
with that presumption. 
One reading of Travelers is that, as to state laws affecting 
benefits, administration, and remedies, something akin to the 
Shaw approach continues, notwithstanding Travelers's proclaimed 
embrace of a presumption against preemption for ERISA 
purposes. Under this construction of Travelers, one tier of state 
laws—those which do not impact upon benefits, administration, 
and remedies—will be subject to traditional, deferential 
preemption analysis while state laws affecting benefits, 
administration, and remedies will be subject to 5/iaw-type 
treatment—^near automatic preemption."^ 
The Coxurt's preemption doctrine is not without its own difficulties. However, that 
doctrine is part of the legal environment against which Congress adopted ERISA. See, 
e.g., Grey, supra note 41. 
Ill Professors Mashaw and Marmor are skeptical of the extent to which Travelers 
changed the law of ERISA preemption. Their skepticism appears to be premised upon an 
understanding of Travelers similar to that discussed in the text. See Jerry L. Mashaw & 
Theodore R. Marmor, Federalism and Health Care: A Reply, 28 CONN. L. REV. 161, 165 
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There is, however, no warrant in the terminology of section 
514(a) (ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any" ERISA-covered plan) 
for a two-tier approach which treats some state laws differently 
than others."® Moreover, Travelers suggests no rationale for such 
differential treatment other than that state laws affecting plan 
administration, benefits, and remedies were previously litigated 
under the capacious Shaw approach and found preempted under 
that approach. Ultimately, this approach, by subjecting some state 
laws to heightened preemption scrutiny, cannot be reconciled with 
the Travelers Court's simultaneous declaration of a presumption 
against preemption. 
An alternative reading of Travelers is that its presumption 
against preemption applies across-the-board but that, when 
ERISA regulates, it does so in such detail that the presumption 
will generally be overcome. This reading is plausible as to state 
laws affecting plan administration and remedies, areas where 
ERISA provides sufficiently elaborate regulation that, even with a 
supposition against preemption, ERISA will generally preempt. 
However, this approach fails to explain why, per Travelers, 
state laws affecting the substance of welfare plans are preempted. 
The absence of substantive federal regulation of welfare plans, 
when combined with the traditional presmnption against 
preemption, indicates that there is no preemption of state laws 
affecting the content of welfare plans since there is no affirmative 
federal regulation occupying the relevant field. Travelers'^ 
embrace of traditional preemption analysis contradicts Travelers'^ 
simultaneous assertion that state laws affecting plan benefit 
structures are generally preempted since, under the traditional 
analysis, the lack of federal regulation, coupled with the 
predisposition against preemption, implies that the states are free 
to fill the regulatory void as to welfare plans. 
A sympathetic observer (and I am one) could explain 
Travelers'^ unsatisfactory disposition of the cases decided under 
Shaw as reflecting the Court balance of conflicting needs. On the 
one hand, the Court, for the normal reasons, e.g., reliance 
interests, judicial self-discipline, desired to maintain its precedent 
intact, precedent which, under Shaw, struck broadly at state laws 
affecting benefits, plan administration, and remedies. On the 
(1995); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812, 820 (8th Cir. 
1998) ("[W]e do not read Travelers to reject all of its prior precedent on the scope of 
ERISA preemption or as a wholesale rejection of the mode of analysis employed in the 
Court's prior precedent."). 
"8 ERISA § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829,897 (1974). 
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other hand, the Court, with equal plausibility, needed to reform its 
understanding of ERISA preemption given the unpalatable 
implications of the Shaw line of cases which threatened to nullify 
basic state regulation of health care; the Court's chosen instrument 
for such reform was the traditional presumption against 
preemption. 
But Travelers, by deploying the traditional presumption 
against preemption, undercut the logic of the Shaw-based 
precedent, precedent which the Court wanted to preserve, but 
which is based on the contrary premise of near-automatic 
preemption. Travelers avoids this dilemma by ignoring it, 
preserving the Shaw-based case law by little more than judicial 
fiat. As I discuss later,"' a more forthright recognition by the 
Court that it has altered its understanding of section 514(a) could 
provide a more persuasive basis for preserving much (though not 
all) of its prior case law while avoiding the pitfalls of the overly-
expansive Shaw approach. 
To summarize: the capacious Shaw test, applied to New 
York's hospital surcharge scheme, would preempt that scheme as 
relating to employers' ERISA-regulated medical plans and would, 
by extension, undermine most (perhaps all) of the states' 
regulation of medical care since such care is heavily financed by 
ERISA-governed arrangements; the limits to preemption 
developed under the Shaw approach ("remote," "tenuous," 
"peripheral," "run-of-the-mill")"" do not convincingly save New 
York's hospital surcharges from preemption; quite reasonably, the 
Travelers Court did not want to invalidate as ERISA-preempted 
New York's surcharges; it was thus necessary to reformulate the 
Court's Shaw-based jurisprudence of ERISA preemption; 
consequently, the Court introduced into the first step of section 
514 analysis the traditional presumption against preemption. 
However, deploying that presumption eroded the premise of the 
Court's Shaw-based case law, case law bottomed on an expansive 
understanding of the statutory "relate to" test; nevertheless, the 
Travelers Court persisted in seeing no contradiction between its 
preservation of the Shaw line of cases and the Court's 
simultaneous repudiation of the expansive reading of section 
514(a) upon which that line is based. The upshot is the internally 
inconsistent opinion in Travelers. 
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.,^^^ dispels any possibility that 
See infra Part IV.B. 
1^0 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
121 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
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Travelers is aberrational. Dillingham makes clear both that there 
will be no return to Shaw and that the Court is reluctant to admit 
that this is so. 
California law allows a contractor to pay lower than prevailing 
wages to apprentices working on public construction projects, but 
only if California has approved the apprenticeship program. 
Separately-funded apprenticeship programs are ERISA-covered 
welfare plans.^^^ California's prevailing wage statute and its 
exception for approved apprenticeship programs do not fall within 
any of the statutory categories protected from section 514(a), viz., 
state banking, insurance, securities, or criminal laws. Under Shaw 
and its progeny, the California prevailing wage statute relates to 
ERISA plans by permitting lower than prevailing wages on public 
construction projects for apprentices in approved apprenticeship 
arrangements; hence, under the Shaw formula, the statute is 
preempted. 
While paying nominal obeisance to Shaw, the Dillingham 
Court made clear that the contrary principles of Travelers govern: 
preemption analysis begins with the presumption that Congress 
intends federal and state law to coexist unless Congress "clear[ly] 
and manifest[ly]"^^'' indicates an intent to preempt; a state law with 
an "indirect economic influence"^^^ on an ERISA-covered plan 
does not "relate to" such plan for purposes of section 514(a); if 
ERISA were to preempt state laws regulating health care, "we 
could scarcely see the end of ERISA's pre-emptive reach;" 
ERISA preemption is generally limited to state laws impinging 
upon plan administration and the design of plan benefits. 
From these Travelers-hosed premises, Dillingham upholds the 
California statute restricting lower wage payments on public 
construction projects to apprentices in state-approved programs; 
"apprenticeship standards and the wages paid on state public 
works have long been regulated by the States."^" These standards 
and wages are "quite remote"^^® from concerns about plan 
122 See ERISA § 3(1), 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974). Apprenticeship programs financed from 
employers' general revenues are not ERISA-covered plans. 
123 Insofar as California's statute is authorized by the federal statute governing 
apprenticeship programs, ERISA section 514(d) might preserve the California law as an 
extension of federal law. See id. § 514(d), at 897. However, since the Court held that the 
California statute does not "relate to" ERISA plans under section 514(a), it was 
unnecessary for the Court to consider the implications of section 514(d). 
12'* New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645,655 (1995) (citations omitted). 
125 Id. at 659. 
126 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 329. 
122 Id. at 330. 
128 Id. 
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administration and the design of plan benefits; it would be 
"unsettling"^^' for ERISA to preempt in areas of traditional state 
regulation, particularly as ERISA itself supplies no regulation in 
these fields; the controlling presumption is that Congress did not 
intend to preempt California law concerning apprenticeship 
programs and wages at public works sites. 
The critical (albeit unstated) premise of Dillingham is that 
California's prevailing wage statute, insofar as it applies to 
apprentices on public construction projects, does not regulate the 
substantive content of apprenticeship programs, but merely 
establishes a reduced minimum wage, conditioned upon the 
apprenticeship program satisfying statutory standards. Given the 
premise that the California law does not substantively regulate the 
terms of apprenticeship programs,"" Dillingham logically flows 
from Travelers and Travelers'^ more restrictive approach to 
ERISA preemption utilizing the presumption against preemption. 
The unpersuasive aspect of Dillingham is the Court's 
insistence that there is continuity between Shaw and Travelers. 
The problem is revealed most clearly in the Dillingham Court's 
concluding observation "that California's prevailing wage laws and 
apprenticeship standards do not have a 'connection with,' and 
therefore do not 'relate to,' ERISA plans.""^ This attempt to 
associate Dillingham with Shaw fails on its face: per Shaw and its 
progeny, the California law restricting reduced wage payments on 
public works to those participating in approved apprenticeship 
programs is literally connected with such programs. 
Concurring in the Dillingham result. Justice Scalia, along with 
Justice Ginsburg, called for more forthright acknowledgment that 
the Court has abandoned its prior understanding of ERISA 
preemption: the "illusory test""^ of the statutory "relate to" 
standard was "doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone 
philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything 
else.""^ Justice Scalia would relegate section 514(a) to tautological 
status, a declaration that ERISA preempts only as to ERISA 
plans, but not as to anything else. 
Id. (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 665). 
The contrary (and not implausible) characterization is that California's prevailing 
wage statute regulates the substance of apprenticeship programs by restricting lower than 
prevailing wages to apprentices participating in approved programs. Under this 
characterization, per Travelers the California law is ERISA-preempted as the substantive 
regulation of the content of an ERISA program. 
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334 (footnote omitted). 
Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
"3 Id. The Travelers Court had cited Henry James for this proposition. Thus, the 
Court seems to have covered all of its philosophical bases. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655. 
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Justice Scalia is right to suggest that Travelers and Dillingham 
depart significantly from the Court's prior Shaw-bsLsed 
jurisprudence of ERISA preemption and to call for greater candor 
in acknowledging the break between Shaw and Travelers}^ 
However, Justice Scalia's proposed construction of section 514 is 
ultimately unpersuasive: as noted previously,"' it is, as a textual 
matter, unconvincing to construe section 514(a) as a redundant 
statement of normal preemption doctrine, i.e., that ERISA 
preempts only as to ERISA plans. Such a construction is 
particularly difficult to square with section 514's exceptions for 
state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal laws, exceptions 
which imply that section 514(a) embodies greater than usual 
preemption scrutiny from which such laws are exempted. 
Significantly, Justice Scalia traces the Court's "new approach 
to ERISA pre-emption," not to Travelers, but to the Court's 
earlier decision in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Harris Trust and Savings Bank.^^^ Justice Scalia cites John 
Hancock for the proposition that ERISA does not "alter 
traditional pre-emption analysis.""' However, in making that 
observation, the John Hancock Court referred not to section 
514(a) and the first stage of ERISA preemption analysis, but to 
section 514's protection for state insurance laws and the second 
stage of analysis, applying that protected category."® John 
Hancock held that state banking, insurance, securities, and 
criminal laws are not immunized from all preemption scrutiny, but 
remain subject to the Court's traditional preemption doctrine. 
However, that conclusion is only sensible if section 514(a), from 
which these state laws are exempt, embodies a more stringent than 
normal approach to preemption. 
Thus, Justice Scalia's Dillingham concurrence properly 
defines the problem—the need to acknowledge the break between 
the Court's old and new approach to ERISA preemption—but 
does not provide a convincing reading of the text of section 514. 
The third of the Court's new preemption cases, De Buono v. 
NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund,™ was authored by 
Justice Stevens. If it overstates to say that in De Buono Justice 
See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
See discussion inpra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
"6 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Id. (quoting John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 89). 
"8 5ee John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 99. Technically, John Hancock only construes 
ERISA's insurance exemption. Logically, John Hancock's approach, i.e., regular 
preemption standards for state laws protected from ERISA preemption, applies as well to 
state banking, securities, and criminal laws. 
13' 520 U.S. 806 (1997). 
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Stevens's FMC dissent"" became the majority view, it does not 
overstate by much. De Buono involved a New York state tax 
levied on the gross receipts of hospitals and similar facilities. The 
trustees of an ERISA-covered welfare plan objected to the tax as 
it applies to a medical clinic operated by their plan; the trustees 
claimed that section 514 preempts the tax. 
Rejecting the trustees' claim, the De Buono Court upheld the 
New York tax on hospitals' gross receipts, relying on Travelers and 
Dillingham and the principles they embody: "a strictly literal 
reading of § 514(a) is impossible since, taken literally, the 
statute's "relate to" standard has no boundaries; there is a 
presumption against preemption, particularly the preemption of 
"the historic police powers of the State includ[ing] the regulation 
of matters of health and safety.""^ The New York gross receipts 
tax neither proscribes nor mandates particular benefits for 
employer-provided plans. In short, the New York tax is one of 
many laws of "general applicability" which, despite its impact on 
the facilities operated by an ERISA plan, is not ERISA-
preempted."^ 
As an application of the Court's normal implied preemption 
analysis, it is hard to fault De Buono. However, De Buono again 
ignores the textual problem of interpreting section 514(a) as a 
statement of the Court's regular implied preemption doctrine: 
Why would the drafters of section 514 have felt compelled to 
restate statutorily the Court's standard implied preemption 
doctrine? If section 514(a) merely embodies traditional 
preemption analysis, what do we make of the statutory exceptions 
for state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal laws? 
One way of characterizing the problem is that the Court has 
framed its choices under section 514 as either near automatic 
preemption without discernible limits (i.e., Shaw and its progeny) 
or the Court's normal preemption doctrine (i.e.. Travelers and its 
progeny) with more stringent treatment for state laws pertaining to 
benefit structures, plan administration, and remedies. The former 
approach leads to unpalatable results, preempting more broadly 
than the Court (and many observers, including me) thinks is 
proper; the latter approach disrespects the text of section 514, 
which is most convincingly read as commanding more than the 
Court's standard doctrine of implied preemption. The Travelers 
formula also preserves the Court's preexisting case law without 
1''® See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,65 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
"1 De Buono. 520 U.S. at 813. 
Id. at 814. 
Id. at 815. 
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confronting the inconsistency between that case law and the 
simultaneous assertion of a presiimption against preemption. 
The question thus becomes whether section 514 can be 
construed more workably to embody a middle way, i.e., more 
exacting than usual preemption scrutiny, but still scrutiny with 
reasonable limits. In the next section, I propose such an 
understanding of section 514 and ERISA preemption. 
IV. CONSTRUING SECTION 514: A REASONED 
TEXTUALIST APPROACH 
A. Outlining the Approach 
In this section, I advance an alternative approach to ERISA 
preemption, an approach which can best be described as 
"reasoned textualism." This approach is textualist as it respects 
the statute—rather than judicial policy predilections or extra-
textual legislative intent—as the primary source of law;^"" this 
approach is reasoned in that—in contrast to the mechanical 
textualism justly deprecated by the critics of Shaw—this approach 
seeks to make section 514 workable by considering the rest of 
ERISA, the legal environment in which section 514 was adopted 
(namely, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of implied 
preemption), and the practical implications of the manner in which 
section 514 is understood. 
As to state laws impinging upon areas where ERISA 
legislates, e.g., the administration of employee benefit plans, the 
fiduciary standards governing such plans, the substantive rules for 
pension plans, this approach utilizes the normal implied 
preemption questions—Has Congress occupied the field? Does 
state law conflict with federal law?—and thus mandates 
examination of particular provisions of the statute to determine if 
such conflict or occupation exists. However, to give content to 
section 514(a) and its "relate to" standard, the usual presumption 
protecting state law is reversed and preemption the rebuttably 
presumed outcome. Section 514(a) thus serves as a statutory 
canon of construction that, for preemption purposes, the 
provisions of ERISA be understood more, rather than less, 
broadly and consequently carry greater than usual preemptive 
force vis-a-vis state law; reasonably close cases are to be resolved 
in favor of preemption. 
Thus, the reasoned textualist approach contrasts with the analysis of those 
commentators who dismiss the statute as hopelessly unhelpful and call on judges to mold 
their own preemption jurisprudence for ERISA. 
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When state laws affect the substance of welfare arrangements, 
the standard implied preemption inquiry—Is there federal law 
which conflicts or occupies the field?—sustains such state laws 
since ERISA itself lacks substantive guidelines with which state 
law conflicts. However, my approach deems this conclusion 
incompatible with section 514 and its command for more than 
standard preemption doctrine. Accordingly, the reasoned 
textualist approach construes section 514 as forbidding state 
regulation of the content of welfare plans even though there is no 
federal law which conflicts or occupies the field. In this context, 
section 514(a) establishes a zone of employer autonomy as to the 
content of welfare plans; ERISA's silence as to that content is not 
an invitation for the states to intrude but, per section 514(a), a 
directive to stay out also. 
For these purposes, the zone of employer autonomy is defined 
by reference to ERISA's substantive regulation of pensions:^'*' if 
ERISA affirmatively regulates a particular facet of pension plans 
(e.g., the employees who must be covered by such plans), the 
combination of section 514 and ERISA's silence on that subject as 
to welfare plans consigns that subject to employer autonomy. 
Thus, as to a state law impacting upon the substance of welfare 
plans, the Court should ask whether such law intrudes upon the 
zone of employer autonomy defined by reference to ERISA's 
regulation of pension plans. If the challenged state law intrudes 
upon the zone of employer autonomy so defined, the law is 
ERISA-preempted and the zone thereby preserved from state as 
well as federal regulation. 
Finally, if either a pension or welfare plan is touched by a 
state banking, securities, insurance, or criminal law, my approach 
reads the statute's exemptions for these four categories of state 
law as mandating regular implied preemption analysis with its 
predisposition against preemption. 
This understanding of the statute gives content to section 
514(a), treating it both as a reversal of the normal presumption 
against preemption and as a statutory statement of the zone of 
employer autonomy as to the substance of welfare plans. This 
construction of section 514 also preserves the textual integrity of 
the exceptions for state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal 
laws in the second step of the statutory analysis by ensuring that 
there is indeed something from which to except such laws, namely, 
section 514(a)'s presumption for preemption. This reading of 
section 514(a) avoids the problem that "everything is related to 
This methodology is developed further infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
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everything else"''*® by construing section 514(a) as a command to 
expand preemption beyond traditional boundaries, by presuming 
preemption and by respecting the zone of employer autonomy as 
to the substance of welfare arrangements, but not as a charge to 
push the "relates to" terminology to its furthest possible reaches. 
Finally, this reading of section 514 abandons the problematic 
distinctions under Travelers among effects which are "direct," 
"indirect," and "indirect but acute." 
This approach to ERISA preemption is more workable and 
better respects the statute than does the Travelers formula which, 
by equating section 514 with the Court's traditional preemption 
doctrine, leaves too many anomalies: Why did ERISA incorporate 
conventional preemption analysis statutorily when, as a matter of 
well-established case law, that analysis applied anyway? If section 
514(a) merely incorporates traditional implied preemption 
standards, what do we make of the statutory exemptions for state 
securities, banking, insurance, and criminal laws? Why preserve 
the results of the prc-Travelers case law when the fundamental 
premise of Travelers—the traditional presumption against 
preemption—undercuts that case law? 
B. The Alternative Approach and the ShssN-Based Case Law 
In this subsection, I apply my approach to the cases decided 
by the Supreme Court under Shaw and conclude that, besides 
better respecting the statute than does the Travelers framework, 
this approach fits more comfortably with many of the Court's prior 
decisions under section 514. When my formula produces different 
outcomes than Shaw, the difference is for the better, yielding more 
appropriate preemption outcomes. 
Consider initially a situation where ERISA affirmatively 
regulates. Consider, in particular, Ingersoll-Rand, in which the 
Court struck as preempted an employee's state law cause of action 
against his employer. ERISA section 510 provides, in the 
employee plan context, a statement of employees' rights vis-a-vis 
employers; section 502 provides remedies for enforcing those 
rights; reading section 514(a) as a presumption for preemption, it 
is more than plausible to construe ERISA sections 502 and 510 
broadly, as occupying the field of employees' plan-related rights 
and remedies against employers to the exclusion of state law 
theories of recovery. Here, the Shaw rule of near automatic 
preemption and the reasoned textualist approach produce the 
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 
U.S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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same outcome, i.e., the preemption of employees' state law 
remedies against employers. 
In contrast, if Ingersoll-Rand is analyzed with a presumption 
against preemption, ERISA's remedies and state law remedies can 
be harmonized with the latter viewed as supplementing the 
former. From this perspective, more accommodating to state law, 
the Ingersoll-Rand Court was wrong to declare that ERISA 
preempts plan-based state law actions against employers since 
these actions can be viewed as augmenting a base level of federal 
remedies. 
In implicit recognition of this (or similar) logic. Travelers 
preserves Ingersoll-Rand by declaring in ipse dixit fashion that 
(notwithstanding the newly-announced presumption against 
ERISA preemption) state laws affecting plan remedies are still 
preempted under Travelers. However, there is no rationale for 
this declaration other than the Court's apparent desire to preserve 
case law which, examined ab initio, is incompatible with the 
Travelers predisposition against preemption. 
Ingersoll-Rand thus highlights the internal inconsistency of 
the Travelers framework which, on the one hand, proclaims a 
presumption against preemption but which, on the other hand, 
declares that the Shaw-hsLS&d case law remains in effect—even 
though cases like Ingersoll-Rand should be decided differently 
with a presumption against preemption, a presumption which 
suggests that state law remedies supplement, rather than 
challenge, federal law. In contrast, if section 514(a) is interpreted 
as a rebuttal predisposition for preemption, Ingersoll-Rand is 
correctly decided given the scope of rights and remedies 
established by sections 502 and 510, sections which together 
provide a reasonably comprehensive legal framework for 
employer-employee relations in the context of ERISA plans and 
which, viewed from a presumption for preemption, furnish an 
exhaustive federal statement of employees' rights vis-a-vis 
employers. 
In reaching this conclusion under the reasoned textualist 
approach, section 514(a) plays a critical role as (contra Travelers) 
creating a presumption for preemption. Whether a field is 
occupied by a particular statute or whether there is conflict 
between different laws are not mechanical inquiries, but require 
judgments heavily influenced by the predispositions brought to 
them. Given a presumption that ERISA conflicts with state law or 
displaces it, the import of ERISA will be defined more broadly, 
heightening the possibility of conflict or displacement; conversely, 
given a predisposition to uphold state law, the ambit of ERISA 
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will be understood more restrictively, thus minimizing the 
potential clash between ERISA and state law. 
When state laws affect the substance of welfare plans, the 
reasoned textualist approach first defines the zone of employer 
autonomy by examining ERISA's regulation of pension plans and 
by extrapolating from such regulation the subjects which, by 
analogy, ERISA consigns to employer autonomy (rather than 
regulating). This approach then determines if the challenged state 
law impinges upon that ERISA-created zone of employer 
autonomy. In this context also, the reasoned textualist vantage 
more comfortably preserves the results of much of the 5/zaw-based 
case law than does the Travelers framework. 
Consider initially Shaw itself. If we apply the Travelers 
presumption against preemption, Shaw, which struck New York's 
statute mandating pregnancy-based disability benefits, was decided 
wrongly: there is no irreconcilable conflict when New York 
requires pregnancy-based disability benefits for employees, but 
federal law does not. Federal law, given a predisposition against 
preemption, can be viewed as a floor which establishes minimum 
protections nationally, but which does not preclude supplemental 
state regulation above that minimum; since federal law does not 
occupy the field exclusively, states are free to augment the federal 
floor if they want to add further rights for pregnant women. 
Hence, looking at the facts of Shaw ab initio, the presumption 
against preemption suggests that, contrary to the Court's actual 
holding in Shaw, section 514 does not displace New York's more 
demanding law requiring pregnancy-based disability payments, a 
law which supplements basic federal protections. 
To avoid this conclusion and preserve the ^XQ-Travelers case 
law, the Travelers Court decreed that state laws affecting benefit 
structures are preempted—^without explaining why this should be 
so given a presumption against preemption. In effect, the 
Travelers Court says that the result in Shaw—preemption of the 
New York pregnancy disability law—will remain good law because 
the Court wants it to remain good law, notwithstanding the 
incompatibility between the Court's result in Shaw and the Court's 
new jurisprudence of ERISA preemption which presumes against 
the preemption found in Shaw. 
A reasoned textualist analysis better comports with the 
outcome in Shaw, the New York statute mandating pregnancy 
disability benefits impinges upon the zone of employer autonomy 
as to the substance of welfare plans and is consequently 
preempted. 
At first blush, section 514(a) seems to create a zone of 
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employer autonomy without defining the dimensions of that zone. 
On a second look, however, the pension provisions of ERISA 
provide guidance as to the contours of that zone by regulating 
deferred compensation plans and thereby identifying the topics 
which, were the statute to regulate the content of welfare plans, 
would be the appropriate targets of such regulation. In effect, 
ERISA's regulation of pension plans constitutes a blueprint for a 
parallel scheme of shadow regulation for welfare arrangements 
and thereby defines for such arrangements the areas which the 
statute could have but does not govern, areas thus relegated to the 
regime of employer determination. 
Reading ERISA in this fashion, it regulates in detail pension 
payments, prescribing the form"^ and the timing of such 
payments.^''® A parallel scheme of welfare plan regulation would 
similarly govern the form and timing of welfare benefit 
distributions; that ERISA is silent on the subject of welfare plan 
distributions (while it addresses in detail the topic of pension plan 
distributions) indicates that the form and timing of welfare plan 
payments are consigned to the zone of employer autonomy. 
Hence, it is the employer's decision as to form and timing whether 
or not welfare plan payments will take the form of pregnancy 
benefits. 
ERISA's specific approach to pension plan disability benefits 
confirms that the provision vel non of such benefits by welfare 
arrangements is committed to the employer's discretion. While 
ERISA mandates the timing and form of many kinds of pension 
benefit payments,^'" ERISA facilitates but does not require 
pension distributions on disability.^'" A fortiori, if pension plans 
(subject to detailed regulation of their distributions) can, in the 
employer's discretion, provide disability payments or not, welfare 
plans (free of all regulation of their distributions) can similarly 
provide disability payments or not. 
Thus, extrapolating from ERISA's approach to pension 
distributions in general, and disability benefits in particular, the 
zone of employer welfare plan autonomy extends to the 
employer's decision to furnish or elect against disability payments 
and to specify covered disabilities if such payments are furnished. 
The New York law mandating pregnancy disability benefits 
See ERISA § 205, 88 Stat. 829, 862 (1974); I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(ll), 417 (West 1999) 
(dealing with spousal survivorship distributions). 
See I.R.C. § 72(t) (dealing with penalties for early distributions); id. § 401(a)(9) 
(dealing with required distributions at certain ages). 
I'" See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii) (West 1999) (suspending a 10% penalty on earlier 
distributions in case of employee disability). 
1999] ERISA PREEMPTION 845 
intrudes upon the zone of employer judgment by mandating that 
welfare plans offer a specific form of disability benefit. Hence, the 
New York law is ERISA-preempted. 
The analysis of EMC under the reasoned textualist approach 
is similar: in EMC, the employer's medical plan (an ERISA-
governed welfare arrangement) defined the participant's 
substantive benefit as the participant's medical costs minus the 
participant's reimbursement from other somces; Pennsylvania's 
anti-subrogation statute, if applicable to welfare arrangements, 
would increase the dollar amount of the medical plan's benefits by 
forcing such plan to ignore the participant's indemnification from 
other sources, thus requiring the plan to defray the participant's 
gross (rather than net) medical expenses. While ERISA regulates 
pension contributions and benefits in many respects, it permits 
employers to set the amount of such contributions and benefits 
within broad statutory limits;^^^ a fortiori, ERISA's zone of 
employer autonomy frees employers to set the level of the welfare 
benefits they provide. Consequently, ERISA preempts 
Pennsylvania's substantive regulation of medical plan benefit 
levels via Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation statute. 
A comparable analysis applies to the last of the Shaw line of 
cases, Washington Board of Trade}^^ The D.C. workers' 
compensation statute requiring health coverage for injured 
employees regulates a topic which ERISA addresses in detail as to 
pensions, but not welfare plans, i.e., coverage. Among ERISA's 
most intricate provisions are those mandating which employees 
must participate in qualified deferred compensation 
arrangements;^'^ in contrast, ERISA says nothing about the 
coverage of medical plans and other welfare arrangements. 
Reading section 514(a) in the context of ERISA's elaborate 
coverage rules for pensions, the D.C. statute tells employers 
something which ERISA reserves for the employer's own decision, 
i.e., who is covered for health benefits. 
Finally, in comparison with Travelers, the reasoned textualist 
approach more satisfactorily preserves the result in Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.As I have emphasized, a 
See id. § 415. Among its other provisions, ERISA requires that benefits and 
contributions be provided to rank-in-file participants on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
ERISA also regulates minimum funding levels for pension plans to guarantee such plans' 
ability to pay promised benefits. See id. §§ 40i(a)(4), 412. However, within these 
boundaries, employers are free to determine the level of benefits or contributions their 
respective plans will provide. 
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992). 
See I.R.C. § 410 (West 1999); ERISA § 202,88 Stat. 829,853 (1974). 
"t 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
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conundrum under the Travelers framework is what to do with the 
statutory exemptions for state banking, insurance, securities, and 
criminal laws if section 514(a) merely embodies the traditional 
presumption against preemption.^" If, on the other hand, section 
514(a) creates a predisposition for preemption, these exemptions 
are most naturally read as restoring in the exempted areas the 
traditional presumption against preemption. Under that 
presumption, the insurance law mandating mental health benefits 
for policies sold within Massachusetts is compatible with ERISA, 
as the Massachusetts statute merely controls the content of 
insurance products which ERISA plans are then free to purchase 
or not.^" 
While the reasoned textualist approach better preserves much 
of the Shaw case law than does Travelers, this approach does not 
preserve all of that case law. In particular, my analysis indicates 
that Mackey and Dedeaux were wrongly decided. 
Turning first to Mackey, under my approach, whether or not 
state garnishment laws apply to welfare plan benefits is a matter of 
the employer's discretionary plan design; the employer can 
structure welfare benefits with or without spendthrift protection. 
Thus, neither the Mackey majority (which held that welfare plan 
benefits are always garnishable) nor the Mackey minority (which 
held that such benefits never are) got it right: it is the employer's 
call. 
From the reasoned textualist vantage, ERISA's silence as to 
the spendthrift status of welfare plan benefits is most naturally 
read as freeing employers to design such plans with (or without) 
spendthrift clauses. While ERISA section 206(d)(1) commands 
that pension benefits must be inalienable,"^ the absence of a 
welfare plan counterpart to section 206(d)(1) places the issue of 
benefit alienability in section 514(a)'s zone of employer discretion 
over the content of welfare arrangements; employers can, but need 
not, design their welfare arrangements with spendthrift clauses. 
State garnishment statutes are consistent with employer autonomy 
when employers reject spendthrift-protected welfare benefits, 
thereby permitting state garnishment statutes to apply to such 
benefits; in contrast, ERISA preempts state garnishment statutes 
when employers define welfare benefits as protected from 
See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
156 By the same token, the state regulation of insurance reserves, at issue in John 
Hancock, is presumptively not preempted by ERISA. 
15' Subject to certain exceptions such as qualified domestic relations orders. See 
ERISA § 206(d)(3). This section was not included in the original 1974 ERISA legislation, 
but was added under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 99 Stat. 1426 
(codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1994)). 
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alienation. 
The Mackey majority thus drew the wrong conclusion from 
the fact ERISA mandates spendthrift protection for pension 
benefits but not for welfare payments; ERISA's silence on the 
inalienability vel non of welfare benefits does not mean that such 
benefits are always garnishable, but that it is the employer's 
substantive decision to provide welfare plans with spendthrift 
protection or not. If an employer's welfare plan has a spendthrift 
clause, that clause should be respected like the employer's other 
decisions about plan content and state garnishment law 
consequently kept at bay per section 514(a); similarly, if an 
employer declines spendthrift protection for its welfare plan, that 
is an equally valid decision about benefit design, subjecting plan 
benefits to garnishment and other forms of alienation.^^® 
Similarly, from the reasoned textual vantage, the rule of the 
Mackey minority—welfare benefits are never garnishable—goes 
too far in the opposite direction. If employers elect spendthrift 
protection for welfare plan benefits, section 514(a) protects that 
design and state garnishment laws are accordingly stayed as to 
such benefits; if, on the other hand, employers reject spendthrift 
protection for their welfare arrangements, that decision should 
also be respected and state garnishment statutes applied as to 
unprotected welfare benefits. In that case, employers' elections 
against spendthrift protection overcome the presumption that state 
garnishment laws are ERISA-preempted. 
The reasoned textualist approach also indicates that the Court 
decided Dedeaux wrongly. As I discuss below,^'® this conclusion is 
particularly significant for the current controversies about ERISA, 
managed care organizations, the state tort liability of such 
organizations, and states' efforts to regulate such organizations. 
In Dedeaux, the employee sued neither his plan nor his 
employer, but rather a service provider, an insurer hired to process 
claims for the plan and its participants. The distinction among 
plans, employers, and service providers is central to the text of 
ERISA^®" although the distinction was understandably ignored 
The most obvious reason employers would reject spendthrift protection is that they 
envision themselves as potential creditors of their employees; suppose, for example, an 
employee defrauds the employer and the employer seeks a civil recovery; garnishable 
welfare benefits may be the employer's best hope of recovery. 
See discussion infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text. 
160 Under ERISA's prohibited transactions rules, service providers must furnish their 
services to ERISA plans for "reasonable compensation" and cannot otherwise engage in 
financial transactions with such plans. See I.R.C. §§ 4975(c), 4975(d)(2), 4975(e)(2)(B) 
(West 1999); ERISA §§ 3(14)(B), 406(a)(1), 408(b)(2), 88 Stat. 829, 834, 879, 883 (1974). 
On the prohibited transactions rules generally, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Pensions and 
Property Contributions: Wood, Keystone, and the Supreme Court, 56 TAX NOTES 651, 656-
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under the capacious Shaw test of near automatic preemption. 
Under that test, Dedeaux's action against the insurer indeed had a 
connection with the plan to which the insurer furnished services 
and was thus logically found preempted. 
If, however, we pull back from the Shaw standard and 
reexamine ERISA section 502 afresh, a central feature of that 
procedural provision is that it grants remedies against plans, 
employers,^®^ and fiduciaries, but not against service providers such 
as the insurer hired in Dedeaux. Moreover, as a substantive 
matter, ERISA regulates in detail plans, employers, and fiduciaries 
but not such service providers. Hence, examined as a whole, 
ERISA can properly be viewed as a comprehensive scheme which, 
given a presumption for preemption of state law, forecloses 
participants' state law actions against the parties governed by 
ERISA, i.e., plans, employers, and fiduciaries. 
In contrast, ERISA acknowledges the existence of service 
providers, but leaves them essentially untouched.^®^ While 
ERISA's nonregulation of service providers might suggest that 
service providers are, in their relationships with plans and 
participants, free of legal restraints (since ERISA preempts state 
law without providing any regulatory framework for service 
providers), the more compelling inference is that service providers 
and their relationships with plans and plan participants are 
supervised by state law. Service providers mark the boundary 
where ERISA ends and state law begins. 
The inference that ERISA precludes the application of state 
law to service providers proves too much, indeed, effectively 
leaves service providers in a state of nature. Suppose, for example, 
that a pension plan pays an actuary for professional services which 
services the actuary does not perform; suppose further that the 
plan sues the actuary for the return of the fee. Substantively, no 
provision of ERISA requires professionals to perform the services 
for which they are paid; procedurally, no provision of section 502 
enables the plan to recover its payment since section 502 provides 
no remedies against service providers. While we could conclude 
that the plan is simply out of luck, I doubt that many would 
embrace that conclusion. 
To avoid the deduction that ERISA preempts state law 
57 (1992); Edward A. Zelinsky, Property Contributions to Qualified Plans: The DOL 
Threatens Established Tax Law, 62 TAX NOTES 753,754 (1994). Except for the provisions 
of the prohibited transactions rules, ERISA does not regulate service providers. 
For these purposes, the regulation of employers includes the regulation of the plan 
administrators to whom employers may delegate their administrative obligations. See 
ERISA § 3(16), at 835. 
See supra note 160. 
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remedies against the actuary, we might try, under Shaw, to 
characterize such remedies as remote, tenuous, peripheral, or run-
of-the-mill to the plan and ERISA's legal framework. Ultimately, 
however, those formulations are, at best, of little help, at worst, are 
conclusory labels for desired results. 
A more convincing reading of the statute is that service 
providers remain within the sphere of state law as ERISA only 
governs relations among plans, employers, participants, and 
fiduciaries. Dedeaux consequently overcomes the presumption for 
preemption by demonstrating that he is suing in state court only a 
service provider; substantively and procedurally, his relationship 
with that service provider falls outside the scope of ERISA and 
comes within the sphere of state law. 
It is, in short, a sensible reading of ERISA from the reasoned 
textualist vantage to view the statute as a comprehensive (and 
consequently exclusive) statement of the legal relationship among 
plans, employers, participants, and fiduciaries. However, service 
providers, acknowledged but unregulated by ERISA, stand just 
outside the border of this regulatory scheme and remain within the 
sphere of state law. Dedeaux should have been permitted to 
proceed with his case. 
C. Reasoned Textualism, Travelers, and Boggs 
The reasoned textualist method not only better preserves 
much of the Shaw-bsLS&d case law than does the Travelers 
framework, but that method more convincingly justifies the results 
in Travelers itself, i.e., the preservation of New York's scheme of 
hospital surcharges. 
A reasoned textualist approach to Travelers starts by defining 
the employer's zone of autonomy by looking at ERISA's detailed 
rules on substantive pension matters, e.g., the employees who must 
participate in pension plans and when they must participate,^®^ the 
requirement that plan benefits or contributions not discriminate 
against rank-and-file employees,^®" the rates at which pension 
benefits must accrue and vest,^®® certain mandatory features of plan 
distributions.^®® 
Notwithstanding this extensive regulation of pensions, state 
law may also affect the ultimate level of a participant's pension 
payout. If, for example, features of state corporation law enhance 
See I.R.C. § 410 (West 1999); ERISA §§ 201,202, at 852,853. 
16" See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (West 1999). 
166 See id. § 411; ERISA §§ 203,204, at 854, 858. 
166 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(ll), 401(a)(14), 401(a)(15), 417; ERISA §§ 205, 206(a)-(b), at 
862, 864. 
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(or depress) corporate share values, the quantum of plan assets 
and, hence, plan benefits, will be affected by those features of state 
law.^®^ Similarly, a state's minimum wage statute might reduce the 
profits of a corporation operating in that state with attendant 
impact on the value of the corporation's shares and, hence, 
pension plan assets. Nevertheless, even with a presumption for 
preemption, ERISA does not supersede such state laws under the 
reasoned textualist vantage as ERISA neither occupies the fields 
of corporate or minimum wage law nor is there any conflict 
between the substantive pension provisions of ERISA and such 
corporate and minimum wage laws. 
Against this background and analogizing from it, section 
514(a)'s zone of employer autonomy for welfare plans covers such 
matters as who participates in such plans and when, and the 
amount and scope of welfare plan benefits—areas which ERISA 
regulates for pensions but which, per section 514(a), are consigned 
to employer discretion in the welfare context. However, the 
employers' sphere of autonomy does not extend to state laws 
which (like corporate and minimum wage statutes) affect welfare 
plans economically, but which do not touch on the subjects within 
this protected sphere. Since, on a searching reading of ERISA, 
state corporate and minimum wage statutes are consistent with 
ERISA's regulation of pension plans, such statutes are consistent 
with ERISA's nonregulation of welfare plans. 
New York's hospital surcharge scheme is analogous to state 
corporation and minimum wage laws in its effect on plans and in 
its compatibility with the substantive provisions of ERISA. 
Hence, New York can maintain its network of hospital surcharges 
since these surcharges, while making commercial insurance and 
self-funding more expensive than Blue Cross policies, do not 
intrude upon the zone of employer autonomy as to the substance 
of welfare arrangements (e.g., determining who participates in 
such plans and how much in benefits they receive). 
In contrast. Travelers sustains the New York hospital 
surcharges by relying on two problematic notions. One of these— 
state laws which affect ERISA plans indirectly, but "acutely"—is 
particularly difficult to apply in cases like Travelers: while the 
If the plan is a defined contribution arrangement, the impact of state law is direct, as 
the participant's benefit is a function of the value of the assets in his individual account. 
The impact of state law upon the employee is more subtle in a defined benefit context 
since the employer is legally obligated to make good any shortfall between the benefits 
promised by the plan and plan assets. On the other hand, fewer plan assets make it more 
difficult to increase plan benefits. In the worst case scenario—plan insolvency—the 
employee covered by a defined benefit plan would look to his employer and, if applicable, 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's insurance program. 
1999] ERISA PREEMPTION 851 
Court concluded otherwise, a twenty-four percent (24%) addition 
to a Manhattan hospital bill will strike many as acute in its effect. 
The second troubling notion in Travelers—the distinction 
between those state laws enjoying a presumption against 
preemption and other laws generally preempted—finds no basis in 
the statute which, on its face, commands a single preemption 
standard for "any and all state laws."^®^ It is, moreover, hard to 
reconcile Travelers's proclamation of a class of state laws generally 
preempted by ERISA (laws affecting plan administration, benefits, 
and remedies) with Travelers's simultaneous (and inconsistent) 
embrace of a presumption against preemption. 
Similar observations can be made about De Buono and the 
New York State tax levied on hospitals' gross receipts, suggesting, 
again, that the reasoned textualist approach more persuasively 
justifies the Court's results under Travelers than does Travelers 
itself. The tax at issue in De Buono does not regulate the 
substance of welfare plans, e.g., who participates in such plans, 
what benefits such plans offer. Rather, the New York tax on 
hospital receipts is just that, a levy on hospitals, not a regulation of 
welfare plan content. Insofar as the tax is absorbed by the 
hospitals themselves, the tax decreases the hospitals' value and, 
thus, the net worth of the welfare plans which in De Buono owned 
such hospitals. However, that tax does not intrude upon the 
ERISA-established zone of employer autonomy any more than do 
state corporation and minimum wage laws which can similarly 
affect the value of plan assets.^®' 
168 ERISA § 514(a), at 897. 
16' In the third of the Travelers cases, Dillingham, the Court's critical move is to treat 
the California prevailing wage statute as a minimum wage law, rather than as a regulation 
of the substance of apprenticeship programs. Under the Travelers framework, state laws 
affecting "benefit structures" are subject to more rigorous preemption scrutiny; in 
summarily rejecting that alternative, the Dillingham Court instead applied the 
presumption against preemption to the California statute, thus deciding that the statute is 
properly characterized as regulating wages rather than plan content. See California Div. 
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316 (1997). Using 
the same assumption under my approach, the result is the same as the Court's: viewing the 
California statute as regulating wages rather than the content of apprenticeship programs, 
that statute falls outside the zone of employer autonomy and is thus not preempted. 
If, on the other hand, Dillingham is approached with a totally clean slate, my 
analysis and conclusion would be different: examined ab initio, the California statute 
strikes me as regulating the content of apprenticeship plans analogously to ERISA's 
attempt to constrain the substance of pension plans through the nondiscrimination rules; 
just as the nondiscrimination rules are designed to increase the pension benefits and 
contributions of rank-and-file participants by linking their pension levels to those of 
management, the California statute affects the substance of apprenticeship programs by 
linking contractors' ability to pay lower wages on public contracts to the satisfaction of 
California standards for apprenticeship programs. Under this characterization, the 
California statute intrudes upon the zone of employer autonomy as a regulation of the 
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Perhaps the best evidence of the superiority of the reasoned 
textualist approach is the Court's decision in Boggs v. Boggs™ to 
ignore Travelers, indeed to ignore section 514 altogether; had the 
Court applied Travelers in Boggs, would have gone the 
other way. 
Factually, Boggs presented a fairly typical situation: Isaac 
Boggs, a widower, remarried toward the end of his working life; he 
died four years into retirement; his children from Isaac's first 
marriage claimed an interest in his pension; Isaac s second wife, 
Sandra (now his widow), resisted, claiming the entire pension for 
herself.^"'^ 
Two aspects of the Boggs situation set the stage for a 
showdown in the United States Supreme Court. First, the Boggs 
family lived in Louisiana, a community property state. Second, 
Dorothy Boggs, Isaac's first wife, had, when she died, left an 
interest in her estate to her children with Isaac."^ Hence, under 
Louisiana's community property laws, Isaac s children from his 
first marriage had a strong claim, via their mother, to part of 
Isaac's pension: as community property, one-half of Isaac's 
pension was Dorothy's; Dorothy provided that her assets were to 
go to her children on Isaac's death; with Isaac gone, the children 
were entitled to the interest in Isaac's pension which had belonged 
to their mother and had been left to them by her. 
However, Sandra, supported by the Solicitor General, 
convinced a bare majority of the Court that ERISA s provisions 
mandating spousal survivor benefits^" and spendthrift protection"" 
preempt Louisiana's community property law."' From this 
vantage, ERISA creates for the surviving widow (Sandra) an 
substance of welfare plans, i.e., the terms of apprenticeship programs; given the 
presumption of preemption, the statute is preempted. -c • • 
Similarly, under the Travelers framework, the California statute is preempted if it is 
characterized as a regulation of plan content (rather than a minimum wage law) since, 
under Travelers, state laws affecting benefit structures are subject to greater preemption 
scrutiny, rather than the presumption against preemption. Thus, under either framework, 
mine or Travelers'^, the California statute is ERISA-preempted if characterized as 
regulating the substance of apprenticeship programs; under my approach, the statute, so 
characterized, intrudes on the zone of employer autonomy as to welfare plan content; 
under Travelers, the statute, so characterized, is subjected to the more stringent standard 
for preemption applying to laws affecting plan benefit structures. 
1™ 520 U.S. 833 (1997). 
171 See id. at 836-37. . . 
177 In particular, Dorothy left her offspring a remainder interest in two-thirds ot 
Dorothy's assets, such remainder interest to take effect upon Isaac's subsequent death. 
See id. 
173 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 417 (West 1999); ERISA § 205, at 862. 
17" See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13); ERISA § 206(d), at 864-65. 
173 See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 853. 
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overriding federal entitlement to the deceased participant's 
pension, an entitlement which state law cannot nullify or offset. 
Under the Travelers framework (ignored by the Boggs Court), 
this conclusion is wrong. Starting with the Travelers presumption 
against preemption, ERISA's spousal annuity and spendthrift 
provisions can be harmonized with Louisiana community property 
law, leaving the state law intact. As Justice Breyer noted in his 
Boggs dissent,^^® Isaac's pension could, per federal law, be payable 
to Sandra as his surviving widow while Louisiana, as a matter of 
local property law, could award other assets of Isaac's estate to his 
children to compensate them for the pension interest which, under 
community property law, is theirs but which, under ERISA, is 
payable to their father's widow."^ 
In contrast, the reasoned textualist approach justifies the 
majority outcome in Boggs under the rubric of section 514, i.e., 
Sandra receives Isaac's pension free of the children's community 
property claims and of the need for any compensating offset to the 
children from the rest of Isaac's assets. Starting with a 
presumption for preemption per section 514, the import of 
ERISA's spousal protection provisions can be understood more 
(rather than less) broadly, as conferring upon Isaac's widow an 
entitlement to his pension under a federal form of community 
property law which the state cannot offset through the allocation 
of other items in Isaac's estate. Under the reasoned textualist 
approach, section 514 is not (as it was for the Boggs majority) a 
problem to be ignored, but rather, construed as a presumption for 
preemption, is a more convincing explanation for the majority's 
conclusion. 
Boggs is a close case—as witnessed by the Court's 5-4 split— 
but those are the cases where a presumption makes a difference. 
The Boggs majority reached its result only by disregarding the 
Travelers presumption against preemption and by ignoring section 
514. In contrast, the reasoned textualist approach, which adds to 
Sandra's side the weight of a statutory predisposition for 
preemption, justifies the Boggs outcome and its more expansive 
understanding of ERISA's spousal.protection provisions as a form 
of superseding federal community property law in plan benefits 
which the states are forbidden to nullify or offset. 
1'* See id. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, Boggs does not fali within any of the categories Travelers designates for 
more exacting ERISA preemption scrutiny, i.e., state laws affecting plan benefit 
structures, plan administration, and remedies. 
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D. HMO Tort Liability and the Regulation of Managed Care 
The issues which have recently made ERISA preemption a 
politically contentious matter are the issues of tort liability in the 
managed care context and the state regulation of managed care 
organizations. 
In the tort setting, much popular and scholarly attention has 
focused upon the processes by which managed care arrangements 
prescreen proposed medical procedures and the cases in which 
such managed care utilization review processes arguably 
miscarry."® The typical case involves an employee covered by his 
employer's medical plan whose physician prescribes a particular 
course of treatment; rmder the employer's plan, this prescribed 
regimen is reviewed by an entity hired for that purpose, an 
insurance company or other managed care firm to which the 
employer has contracted the administration of the plan. The 
reported cases invariably entail tragic circumstances, e.g., a cancer 
patient denied treatment who later dies."' If the denial of 
treatment was wrongful and caused the patient's injury, the inquiry 
then becomes what, if any, remedies are available.^®" 
ERISA section 502, in these cases, provides only for 
"recover[y of] benefits due" under the plan.^®^ While in many 
instances the recovery of previously-denied benefits constitutes 
full and fair compensation (e.g., the restoration of a pension 
participant's disallowed retirement payments), in a managed care 
utilization review case, it is often too late for the restoration of 
plan benefits to constitute a meaningful recovery; the employee, as 
a result of the deprivation of medical care, has frequently suffered 
medically irreversible harm, indeed has often died. What, then, 
about possible remedies under state law tort theories? 
Dedeaux, as decided per the Shaw test of near automatic 
preemption, counsels that ERISA preempts any state law remedy 
See, e.g.. Amy F. Khen, Comment, Are We Protected from HMO Negligence? An 
Examination of Ohio Law, ERISA Preemption, and Legislative Initiatives, 30 AKRON L. 
REV. 501 (1997). 
™ See, e.g., Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that ERISA 
preempts claims based upon denial of therapy to participant who died from brain tumor); 
Benoit v. W.W. Granger, Inc., 22 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2034 (E.D. La. 1998) 
(holding that ERISA preempts claims based upon denial of immediate surgery to accident 
victim). 
180 Note that, in the managed care context, the conclusion that treatment is unnecessary 
or unauthorized denies such treatment since prior approval is required for treatment to 
proceed. In contrast, under fee-for-service medicine and traditional medical insurance, 
the insurer's disapproval comes after the service has been performed. Hence, in the 
traditional setting, the consequence of disapproval is not denial of treatment, but denial of 
payment. 
181 ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 829, 891 (1974). 
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against an insurer or other company performing utilization review 
for the employer's managed care plan. Such a remedy, imder 
Shaw and Dedeaux, has a connection with an ERISA-covered 
arrangement, i.e., the employer's medical plan for which the 
review was done; hence, no state law cause of action lies for faulty 
decisions made in the utilization review process. 
The reasoned textualist approach, in contrast, indicates that, 
under a more searching reading of the statute, ERISA does not 
preempt state law remedies when a plan participant sues a service 
provider (since service providers fall outside the ambit of section 
502) and that Dedeaux was thus wrongly decided (since Dedeaux's 
lawsuit against the insurer was aimed at a service provider rather 
than the plan or the employer).^®^ In the utilization review context, 
the critical difference between the ShawlDedeaux approach of 
near automatic preemptions®^ and the reasoned textualist approach 
is that the former focuses upon the nature of the injured plaintiff's 
claim (Does such claim have a connection with an ERISA plan?), 
while the latter focuses upon the identity of the defendant. When 
employees sue service providers (as opposed to plans, employers, 
and fiduciaries) under state tort theories, I conclude, ERISA does 
not preempt (even with the presumption for preemption) since, as 
a textual matter, no provision of ERISA regulates the relationship 
between employees and service providers. There is, in this 
context, no conflict between state tort remedies and ERISA nor 
does ERISA occupy the field since ERISA section 502 says 
nothing about service providers. 
What if the employer's plan performs utilization review in-
house rather than contraeting that function to an outside service 
provider?^®'' Under the reasoned textualist approach, ERISA 
preempts state tort law remedies against plans since section 502, 
given a presumption for preemption, provides the exclusive set of 
remedies vis-a-vis such plans. Under this analysis, a dichotomy 
emerges between plans which perform utilization review functions 
internally (not liable under state law for mistakes because ERISA 
182 See discussion of Dedeaux under the reasoned textualist approach, supra notes 159-
62 and accompanying text. 
18' Insofar as Travelers indicates that greater preemption continues for state laws 
affecting plan participants' remedies, Travelers points in the same direction as Shaw and 
Dedeaux, i.e., the ERISA preemption of state tort law. 
i®"! An aggressive reading of the statute might embrace a "dual function" analysis: while 
the plan as such cannot be sued under a state law theory because plans are covered 
comprehensively by ERISA section 502, the plan, when it steps into the role of being its 
own service provider, is, in that latter capacity, liable imder state law since service 
providers fall outside the ambit of section 502. On balance, however, I think this approach 
pushes the text of the statute too far, bliuring unacceptably the statutory distinction 
between service providers and the plans they service. 
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sections 502 and 514 preempt state law remedies vis-a-vis plans) 
and plans which contract for managed care services (the outside 
service provider being subject to state law theories of recovery 
since service providers, unlike plans themselves, fall outside the 
scope of section 502). To those who would object to this 
distinction, the short answer is that it is found in the statute— 
which distinguishes between plans and service providers—and that 
Congress can change the statute if it desires. 
The longer answer is that Congress, when it passed ERISA in 
1974, could not have foreseen the way medicine in general, and 
employer-provided medicine in particular, would be organized in 
1999. Conceivably (but by no means invariably). Congress would 
have fashioned parts of ERISA differently had it been able to 
divine the configuration of medicine a generation later. 
The issue now is what institution of government, if any, 
should revise today the policies embodied in ERISA. In 
respecting the terms of the statute, including the distinction 
between plans, which are covered by section 502, and service 
providers, which are not, textualism, as is frequently the case, 
becomes a statement of institutional competence. I will address 
this issue more generally in a moment.^^^ For now, I would simply 
observe that Congress and the Executive branch are well aware of 
ERISA preemption;^®® there is simply no political consensus to 
amend the statute.^®' 
My analysis of state laws regulating managed care entities is 
185 See discussion infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. 
186 See, e.g., S. 1890,105th Cong. § 302 (1998); H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302 (1998); S. 
1499,105th Cong. § 202(b) (1997); H.R. 2967,105th Cong. § 202(b) (1997). 
i^i In the text, I explore the issue of state tort liability for utilization review decisions 
since these decisions have received much scholarly and judicial attention. However, my 
analysis applies to more traditional malpractice claims as well. Suppose, for example, that 
an employee covered by his employer's medical plan requires surgery and that the 
surgeon, engaged pinsuant to a managed care arrangement, commits malpractice. Shaw 
and Dedeaux indicate that the employee has no state tort law claim against the surgeon 
(since he rendered medical care in connection with the employer's medical plan) and that 
the employee has no ERISA-based claim, either (since section 502 does not authorize 
malpractice actions). 
To avoid this conclusion, the courts might label the employee's state law malpractice 
claim as having only a "remote," "tenuous," or "peripheral" link to the plan, or as the kind 
of "run-of-the-mill" state law actions ERISA does not preempt. However, as I have 
suggested, these labels are at best conclusory, at worst misleading. 
The reasoned textualist approaeh, in contrast, indicates that ERISA does not 
preempt whatever state law remedies the employee might possess against the physician 
and the managed care organization since these service providers fall outside the coverage 
of section 502. On the other hand, section 502, as a comprehensive statement of remedies 
against employers and plans, preempts the employee's state law claims against his 
employer and its plan. 
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similar. Such legislation takes many forms/®** including states' 
substantive mandates that providers furnish particular services to 
their patients, procedural requirements for utilization review 
decisions, and "any willing provider" statutes which require 
managed care organizations to pay any medical provider (e.g., any 
doctor) for furnished services as long as such provider meets the 
organizations' terms and conditions.*®' 
Under Shaw and Massachusetts Life, ERISA preempts this 
kind of regulatory legislation when it applies to managed care 
entities hired by employers' medical plans. Such legislation is 
indistinguishable from the Massachusetts insurance statute 
deemed to "relate to" ERISA plans by constricting employers' 
choices: just as the Massachusetts statute denied employers the 
option of insuring their medical plans without paying for mental 
health benefits, state laws regulating managed care organizations 
preclude employers from contracting with such organizations 
unless the employers accept the full panoply of state-mandated 
rules imposed upon such organizations. While the Massachusetts 
statute was ultimately saved from preemption by section 514's 
insurance exemption, no such exemption protects from ERISA 
preemption state laws regulating managed care entities. 
In contrast, under the reasoned textualist approach,*'" state 
statutes governing managed care organizations, notwithstanding 
the presumption for preemption, are compatible with ERISA 
because such statutes do not intrude upon the zone of employer 
autonomy defined by reference to ERISA's regulation of 
pensions,*'* a zone extending and limited to such topics as who is 
covered for welfare plan benefits and the amounts and forms of 
such benefits. State statutes regulating managed care entities 
constrict the choices of service providers, but do not require plans 
or employers to use such service providers. 
In this setting, we again see the divergence under the 
reasoned textualist approach between service providers (subject to 
state regulation since ERISA does not govern such providers) and 
plans furnishing their own services in-house (immune from state 
See, e.g., Ellen Perlman, Taming the Managed Care Beast, GOVERNING, May 1998, 
at 28. 
1*' Compare Washington Physicians Serv. Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 
1998) (holding Washington's Alternative Provider Statute is not ERISA-preempted), with 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding 
Arkansas's Patient Protection Act, including its "Any Willing Provider" provision, is 
ERISA-preempted). 
1'° The same is also true under Travelers: state laws regulating managed care entities 
are similar to the New York hospital surcharges upheld in Travelers. 
See discussion supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. 
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regulation since ERISA preempts state laws intruding upon plans' 
zone of autonomy). And, again, the appropriate response to this 
divergence is that it is embodied in the statute and can be changed 
by Congress if the political will exists. 
Finally, consider the proposed preemption provisions of the 
Dingell-Norwood legislation, passed by the House of 
Representatives as this Article goes to publication. The 
conventional understanding of Dingell-Norwood is that, if enacted 
into law, it would restrict the reach of ERISA preemption and 
would correspondingly broaden the tort liabilities of HMOs and 
other managed care organizations. If Shaw and Dedeaux remain 
good law, the Dingell-Norwood provisions, if incorporated into 
section 514, would indeed expand the liabilities of managed care 
entities. 
On the other hand, under the reasoned textualist approach to 
section 514 and ERISA preemption, the Dingell-Norwood 
provisions are largely superfluous since, from the reasoned 
textualist vantage, memaged care organizations, as service 
providers outside ERISA's regulatory scheme, are already subject 
to state law tort obligations. Indeed, under the reasoned textualist 
construction of section 514, Dingell-Norwood, if enacted into law, 
would actually reduce the state law tort liabilities of health care 
providers by imposing upon plaintiffs a general requirement that 
they exhaust their administrative remedies,^" a requirement which 
some (perhaps many, maybe all) states, left to their own devices, 
would not impose. 
V. REASONED TEXTUALISM AND ERISA 
PREEMPnoN IN CONTEXT 
In this section, I place my discussion of ERISA preemption in 
several contexts. By doing so, I hope to confirm the case for the 
reasoned textualist approach to ERISA preemption. I also hope 
that my analysis of ERISA preemption, besides benefiting from 
the insights to be derived in these settings, will contribute some 
insight as well. 
A. Implied Versus Express Preemption 
The courts and commentators typically think of preemption in 
dichotomous terms, as either express or implied: when a federal 
statute contains an explicit statement about that statute's 
preemptive effect, the courts' task is the implementation of that 
192 Indeed, I argue for such change infra Part V.E. 
193 See H.R. 2990,106th Cong. § 1302(a) (1999) (adding to ERISA section 514(f)(3)). 
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statement; when a federal statute lacks an express provision 
delineating the statute's preemptive scope, the preemption inquiry 
determines whether, by implication, the statute conflicts with state 
law or so occupies the field as to preclude simultaneous state 
regulation. 
As a declaration of broad principles, these are useful 
generalizations. The saga of ERISA preemption, however, 
indicates the limits of these generalizations. ERISA preemption is 
best understood as a hybrid, partaking of both express and implied 
preemption. Section 514 is obviously an explicit statutory 
statement on the subject of ERISA's preemptive effect; just as 
obviously, the critical terminology of section 514 ("relate to"), 
standing alone, is enigmatic. The reasoned textualist insight is that 
the terminology of section 514 can be made workable if it is read in 
three contexts; the rest of ERISA, the conventions of implied 
preemption doctrine (i.e., field and conflict preemption), and a 
standard implement from the lawyer's toolkit (i.e., presumption). 
What emerges—section 514(a) as a presumption that 
provisions of ERISA conflict with state law or occupy the field so 
as to exclude state law—does not fit comfortably in either the 
preemption box labeled "express" or the box labeled "implied." 
However, such a reading of section 514 gives meaning to the text 
as a statement to preempt more expansively than normally while 
avoiding the troubling territory where section 514 becomes the 
Godzilla of preemption, crushing everything in its path. 
Consider, again, in this context Dedeaux and Boggs. In 
Dedeaux, the Court, after examining section 514(a), placed it aside 
to examine independently the implied preemptive effect of section 
502; in Boggs, the Court ignored section 514(a) altogether. From a 
textualist perspective, both of these cases are troubling: section 514 
is in the statute. It is one thing to resort to implied preemption 
when a statute is silent as to its preemptive effect; it is another to 
use implied preemption doctrine as a means of ignoring a difficult, 
but express, preemption provision. 
On the other hand, section 514(a) as an express preemption 
statute is, as the Court has repeatedly noted, not a model of 
draftsmanship. The only way to reconcile the conflicting 
imperatives—to give eontent to the text of section 514(a) while 
reaching reasonable results—is to breach the dichotomy between 
express and implied preemption, to read section 514(a) as a 
statutory command to presume preemption by reading broadly the 
import of ERISA's other provisions and, with that presumption, to 
ask the standard questions of implied preemption doctrine, i.e., 
whether ERISA conflicts with the challenged state law or occupies 
860 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:807 
the field to the exclusion of state law. In short, despite its value in 
other settings, in the context of section 514, a sharp distinction 
between express and implied preemption proves unhelpful since 
only by taking elements from both categories can section 514 be 
respected as statutory text while producing reasonable outcomes. 
B. Path Dependency 
I suspect that the Court might have arrived at this or a similar 
analysis had the ERISA preemption cases come before the Court 
in a different order than they did. Thus, a second lesson of the 
saga of ERISA preemption is that legal doctrine can indeed be 
path dependent."" 
In an important sense, the Court's expansive reading of 
section 514 in Shaw and Massachusetts Life made no practical 
difference in those cases. Federal law had, for years subsequent to 
those at issue in Shaw, banned discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy; consequently, in striking New York's law protecting 
pregnant employees, the Court was denying such protection only 
for years which had already passed, not for the future when the 
new federal statute applies. Similarly, in Massachusetts Life, the 
Court's expansive reading of section 514(a)'s "relate to" 
terminology made no ultimate difference since, at the second stage 
of the section 514 inquiry, the Massachusetts law survived as an 
exempted insurance regulation. In these cases, the practical 
implications of the Shaw standard looked, if not benign, at least 
manageable. Then, by the time of Dedeaux, Shaw and 
Massachusetts Life had committed the Court to an expansive 
reading of section 514 even though the implications in Dedeaux 
were more troubling, i.e., denying Mr. Dedeaux his remedy. 
It is interesting to speculate as to the Court's course had 
Dedeaux come first. Perhaps Dedeaux would then have been the 
occasion for articulating initially the expansive understanding of 
section 514's "relate to" terminology actually announced in Shaw, 
in this case, the Court's interpretation of ERISA preemption as 
nearly automatic would have unfolded as it in fact did. On the 
other hand, it is possible that Dedeaux, decided before there was a 
Shaw, might have given the Court greater pause and led to a 
narrower formulation of the reach of ERISA preemption. 
To stretch the hypotheticals further, suppose that Travelers 
had been the first ERISA preemption case to reach the Court. It 
is, again, possible that, approaching ERISA preemption afresh, the 
i'" On path dependency, see Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs, 
Robes and Legal Change, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1129. 
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Court would have formulated in this hypothetical Travelers case 
the same expansive reading of section 514 embraced in Shaw. But 
it is also possible that, confronted with the facts of Travelers 
instead of the facts of Shaw, the Court would have declined to 
strike New York's hospital surcharge scheme—as indeed the 
Court later did. The result would have been ab initio a more 
restrained reading of ERISA's preemptive scope. 
C. Varieties of Textualism 
The story of ERISA preemption also highlights the variety of 
approaches which, in current legal parlance, are labeled as 
"textualist."^'' The mechanical, dictionary-based textualism 
underlying Shaw has been widely condemned by commentators, 
and deservedly so; confronted with a statute as enigmatic as 
section 514, a court will not find viable guidance in Webster's; a 
dictionary is not a substitute for judgment or for the searching 
reading of a difficult text. 
It is, however, equally troubling to respond to a trying statute 
by abandoning it. As is clear from the voluminous contemporary 
literature on the subject,^'® when difficult statutes are ignored, 
important values are ignored with them, most notably, respect for 
the legislative process and for politically accountable 
decisionmaking."^ 
What I have labeled "reasoned" textualism is thus an attitude 
which, in the face of a statute like ERISA, defines the judicial task 
as giving a workable construction to the statute, as opposed to 
declaring the statute hopeless and imposing the judiciary's own 
policy preferences. The resulting engagement with the statutory 
text will consider, inter alia, the practical effects of different 
possible interpretations. However, the hallmark of this approach 
is the recognition that, in a world of myriad policy choices, the 
judicial decisionmaker should defer to the choice which emerges 
It is an understatement to say that the scholarly literature on textualism has become 
voluminous. See John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax 
Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, Text, Purpose, Capacity and 
Albertson's; A Response to Professor Geier, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 717 (1996); see, e.g., A 
Symposium on Legal and Political Hermeneutics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883 (1995). 
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Branch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 541, 563-69 (1998). 
1''' Note that disregard of an enigmatic text like section 514 does not flout another 
textualist value, i.e., predictability. When courts spurn reasonably clear statutory 
language, the statute ceases to be a reliable guide as to what the law is, making the law less 
predictable since the statute and the case law point in different directions. However, 
difficult texts like section 514, by their nature, do not provide readily discernible guidance 
to the reader; thus, ignoring such texts does not reduce the predictability of the law—even 
though ignoring such texts reflects diminished respect for the legislative process. 
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from the effort to make the statute workable. 
An increasingly common critique is that judges who claim to 
be textualists are sub silentio imposing their own policy 
preferences in the guise of deference to statutory terminology; 
when push comes to shove, it is argued, these putative textualists 
pursue their personal policy predilections rather than the 
discipline of text-based judging.^'® 
At one level, we should not be surprised that judges have 
conflicting values and that a judge who can, with equanimity, defer 
to legislative policies in many (perhaps most) instances will, in 
other settings, feel so strongly about a particular outcome that his 
commitment to textualism is placed aside. Judges are human. At 
another level, the charge that a particular judge uses textualism (or 
any other method) inconsistently is, in the final analysis, a critique 
of the judge, not the method. 
However, the story of ERISA preemption suggests that the 
approach today called textualism is more compelling for some 
texts than for others; consequently, a judge could, in principled 
fashion, define his task in the ERISA setting as making the statute 
workable, deferring to the policies which emerge from a searching 
reading of the statute, while, in other contexts, viewing the 
relevant text as less constraining. 
ERISA (like the Internal Revenue Code^") is the kind of 
statute which presents a strong case for reasoned textualism: 
intricate, technical, frequently revisited by Congress. Whether one 
conceives of ERISA as a complex balance of technical and policy 
considerations, the complicated accommodation of conflicting 
interests, or a combination of the two,^°° Congress is the 
appropriate forum for any adjustments or changes. But one size 
need not fit all. That a judge properly defines his task in an 
ERISA case as finding a sensible and coherent reading of this 
detailed and textually complex statute tells us nothing about the 
appropriate approach to the Equal Protection Clause. 
D. The Illusiveness of Legislative Intent 
Perhaps the strongest argument for the values underlying 
what we today call textualism is the frequent insistence of its 
1'* The frequently cited exemplar of the judge who consistently placed aside his 
personal policy preferences is Benjamin N. Cardozo. See generally ANDREW L. 
KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998). It is interesting to speculate about the linkage between 
contemporary interest in Justice Cardozo and current interest in textualism. 
Indeed, much of ERISA is part of the Internal Revenue Code. See supra note 11. 
200 My assessment is that it makes the most sense to view ERISA as combining 
complicated policy decisions with equally complex accommodations of varied interest 
groups. 
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opponents that, in cases like ERISA preemption, they advocate, 
not judicial displacement of legislative pronouncements, but a 
purer implementation of legislative intent. In disregarding 
statutory text, it is argued, the judge is not usurping the legislative 
function, but is implementing the underlying legislative program. 
Whatever its merit in other settings,^"^ in the context of 
ERISA, statements of legislative intent are typically so general as 
to be useless, e.g., ERISA was intended to help employees. As I 
hope is clear to the reader,^"^ ERISA is a complex and, in many 
respects, contradictory statute. It regulates some aspects of 
employee plans in excruciating detail;^"^ it leaves other aspects 
totally untouched.^'^ Many provisions of ERISA evince a 
profound paternalism;^"' others reflect the assumption that a 
properly informed employee can fend for himself;^"® yet other 
provisions of ERISA appear to be concessions to employer 
interests 
While I do not doubt the sincerity of those who discern in all 
of this an overriding legislative intent, I confess my skepticism. I 
do, however, find it significant that these commentators often feel 
compelled to justify their disregard of statutory text by resort to 
notions of legislative intent. In one sense, we are all textualists or, 
perhaps more accurately, we all accept—at least nominally—the 
norms (deference to politically-accountable, legislative 
decisionmaking) underlying textualism. 
E. The Case for Repealing Section 514 
My analysis suggests a final question: Should section 514 
remain on the books? I conclude that it should not; Congress 
should repeal section 514 and let the default rule—the Court's 
normal jurisprudence of implied preemption—determine the 
scope of ERISA preemption.^"® 
2°! And I am a skeptic. See Zelinsky, supra note 195. 
2"^ See Branch, supra note 196, at 547 ("The policy choices Congress made in creating 
[ERISA]... reflect a complex balancing of competing interests."). 
For example, ERISA's elaborate regulation of vesting. See I.R.C. § 411(a) (West 
1999); ERISA § 203,88 Stat. 829,854 (1974). 
Such as the employer's decision to provide pension disability benefits vel non. See 
infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
Most obviously, ERISA's coverage rules require employers to include eligible 
employees within qualified plans—whether or not the employees want to be covered. See 
I.R.C. § 410; ERISA § 202, at 853. 
20^ Important provisions of ERISA assure employees access to information on the 
apparent assumption that, once informed, employees can protect their own interests. See 
ERISA §§ 101-107, at 840-50; id. § 502(c), at 891-92. 
2°^ Most obviously, the level of benefits promised by a pension plan is largely within the 
employer's determination—as indeed is the decision whether to have a plan at all. 
In contrast, others conclude that section 514 should be amended. See, e.g., Robert 
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As a substantive matter, this conclusion reflects my 
disenchantment with the policies most naturally read in section 
514: a presumption for preemption, a zone of employer autonomy 
as to the content of welfare plans Procedurally, my conclusion 
that Congress should repeal section 514 reflects the relative 
institutional competence of Congress and the courts. 
ERISA is both a detail resolution of myriad technical issues 
and a complex balancing of contending interests. Only Congress, 
supported by professional staff and acting through specialized 
committees, can pronounce the kind of rules necessary to address 
these issues and balance these interests. In contrast, preemption is 
a matter of interstitial adjustment once substantive policy has been 
formulated legislatively, involving the kind of case-by-case 
determinations best consigned to the courts. 
As long as Congress has allocated to itself primary 
responsibility for ERISA preemption policy, the courts should 
define their role as making that policy as workable as possible. 
Congress would, however, be well-advised to delegate to the 
courts a larger role by abolishing section 514 and thereby letting 
the judiciary, case-by-case, resolve the compatibility of particular 
provisions of ERISA and particular state laws. 
The repeal of section 514—and the consequent resolution of 
ERISA preemption cases under the Court's normal standards— 
would make a practical difference in two kinds of controversies: 
close cases and cases involving the substance of welfare plans. 
As to the former, let us return one last time to Boggs. Either 
of the possible characterizations of the relationship between 
ERISA and Louisiana's community property law is plausible: 
ERISA can reasonably be understood as awarding the surviving 
spouse the pension death benefit as such, but as also permitting 
the state to make an offsetting reduction of the community 
property to which the spouse would otherwise be entitled. 
Alternatively, as the narrow Boggs majority held, ERISA can be 
construed as bestowing upon the surviving spouse an interest in 
the deceased mate's pension which cannot be counterbalanced by 
the state's allocation of the rest of the estate. 
While the Boggs Court ignored section 514(a), the most 
N. Covington, Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 
(1999); Julie K. Locke, The ERISA Amendment: A Prescription to Sue MCOs for 
Wrongful Treatment Decisions, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1027 (1999); Julie K. Freeman, 
Comment, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims Against Managed Care 
Organizations, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 863, 885 (1998) ("The most expeditious and lucid remedy 
would be for Congress to amend ERISA to clearly provide that the medical malpractice of 
managed care organizations will not be shielded by ERISA."). 
See discussion supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
1999] ERISA PREEMPTION 865 
workable construction of that provision in a situation like Boggs is 
as tie-breaker, a canon of construction presuming preemption and 
thus indicating that close cases should be resolved in favor of 
preemption. On that understanding of the statute, section 514's 
repeal would place ERISA under the rubric of the Court s 
traditional implied preemption doctrine which presumes against 
preemption. On that alternative understanding, the Boggs 
minority position, upholding Louisiana's community property law, 
would become the law. 
As to welfare plans, the repeal of section 514 would permit 
the states to regulate the substance of such plans. Under all of the 
possible understandings of section 514—Shaw, Travelers, reasoned 
textualism^i"—section 514 precludes the states from regulating the 
content of welfare arrangements; repeal of section 514 would 
invite such state regulation since there is no federal legislation 
which occupies the field or which would conflict with state statutes. 
In practical terms, upon the repeal of section 514, the states could 
pursue vis-a-vis employer-provided health plans the gamut of 
possible policies, ranging from employer autonomy to extensive 
forms of public regulation. 
The case for repealing section 514 thus ultimately becomes 
the argument for state experimentation and variation. Since 
others have articulated this case so well,^" I limit myself here to 
three observations. First, while the cumulative nature of pension 
entitlements justifies national pension standards in a world of 
employee mobility, the more discrete, annual character of welfare 
plan benefits (in particular, medical arrangements) makes such 
benefits more amenable to state-by-state regulation. Second, the 
repeal of section 514 would have little impact in those areas where 
ERISA affirmatively regulates since ERISA, when it does 
regulate, generally does so exhaustively and thus preemptively. 
Third, the case for abolishing section 514 is reinforced by the 
increasingly problematic nature of the distinction between insured 
and self-insured plans. 
Pension interests are by their nature cumulative over an 
employee's career; an employee sent by his employer from State A 
to State B takes his pension entitlement with him; were States A 
and B to promulgate conflicting regulatory schemes as to that 
21° Shaw displaces state laws affecting the substance of welfare plans by virtue of Shaw's 
capacious test of near automatic preemption. Travelers preempts state laws touching upon 
the content of welfare arrangements because Travelers says it does. The reasoned 
textualist approach preempts state laws impacting upon the substance of welfare plans by 
reading section 514(a) as declaring a zone of employer autonomy as to such substance. 
2" See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 117. 
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continuing entitlement, the two schemes would need to be 
reconciled, a task which would not always be easy. 
Assume, for example, that, in a world where states regulate 
pension vesting. State A vests all pension benefits after three years 
of employment. State B vests after ten years, and an employee 
moves from Ato B after four years of employment. The employee 
in this example was vested in State A having met that state's three 
year requirement. Is he still vested when the employee relocates 
to State B with a longer vesting period he has yet to satisfy? 
One can imagine several possible rules to resolve the conflict 
between State A's more liberal vesting standard and State 5's 
more stringent criterion, e.g., the employee remains vested as to 
benefits earned in State A, but is not yet vested as to benefits 
subsequently accrued in State B\ the employee becomes nonvested 
as to all his benefits upon his move to State B with its longer 
vesting requirements; having earned nonfeitable benefits in State 
A under its more rapid vesting schedule, the employee is allowed 
to use that vesting schedule now that he resides in B, even as to 
benefits earned in B. This plethora of possibilities and the 
likelihood (perhaps inevitability) that the various states will adopt 
conflicting approaches suggests the desirability of a single, 
nationwide vesting standard—as indeed ERISA provides. 
Consider, in contrast, medical benefits and the annual, rather 
than cumulative, nature of such benefits. Suppose, for example, 
that State A mandates that employer plans must provide 
psychological counseling services but that State B does not. If his 
employer provides only the legally-required minimum in each 
state, our hypothetical employee loses prospectively his 
entitlement to such psychological services when he relocates from 
A io B where such services are not part of the local minimum. 
However, there is no retrospective implication to that loss of 
coverage; no one would suggest that the employee must repay the 
amounts for counseling he received while covered by State A's 
mandate; State R's rule would just affect the employee going 
forward, denying him future counseling services as a new resident 
of State B. 
In short, the employee's relocation from State A to State B is 
far simpler as to medical benefits, which can more easily be 
governed by different states' rules on a year-by-year basis, than as 
to pension interests which, because of their cumulative nature, 
raise more difficult problems about retroactive effects and 
conflicting legal regimes. 
Second, the repeal of section 514 would have minimal impact 
in those fields where ERISA affirmatively regulates since ERISA, 
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when it does regulate, usually^^^ does so exhaustively and thus 
preemptively. Hence, as to many provisions of ERISA, the repeal 
of section 514 would not matter as these provisions are so 
extensive that, even with the Court's traditional presumption 
against implied preemption, state law would conflict or be 
squeezed out of an occupied field. If, for example, section 514 
were repealed and a state enacted its own vesting requirements for 
pensions, ERISA's detailed vesting provisions would preempt such 
state requirements—even if there were no section 514 and the 
matter were decided under the Court's normal implied preemption 
standards. 
Third, the case for repealing section 514 is reinforced by the 
increasingly problematic nature of the distinction between insured 
and self-insured plans, an important (but increasingly unworkable) 
feature of section 514 which, via its insurance exemption, 
postulates a reasonably clear boundary between insured and 
noninsured arrangements. Consider, for example, the emergence 
of "stop-loss" policies under which the employer is responsible for 
its employees' medical expenses to a specified threshold with the 
insurer liable for amounts in excess of the threshold. Presumably, 
a state, as a permissible regulation of insurance, can specify 
features of the stop-loss contract issued by the insurer to the plan. 
Can such regulation affect the self-funded features of the plan? 
Can, for example, a state, to insure the solvency of carriers issuing 
stop-loss policies, limit the purchase of such policies to plans with 
prescribed cost controls as to benefits below the stop-loss 
threshold? If so, the state's regulation of insurance effectively 
extends to the self-funded features of plans purchasing stop-loss 
insurance, in practice blurring the distinction between the state's 
jurisdiction over insurance and its nominal lack of authority over 
the noninsured features of welfare plans. If, on the other hand, a 
state cannot regulate the facets of the employer-funded portion of 
the arrangement likely to cause employers to trigger the stop-loss 
coverage, the state's regulation of insurance is severely limited as 
to the traditional function of mandating carrier solvency 
Either way, section 514's distinction between state insurance 
laws, exempted from more stringent preemption standards, and 
the noninsured aspects of welfare plans, immune from state 
212 But not always. Thus, for example, I argued earlier that, given a presumption 
against preemption, section 502, ERISA's remedy provision, can be viewed as a floor of 
basic protections which the states can supplement. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
212 See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712, 723 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that ERISA preempts New York Department of Insurance Actuarial Information Letter 
No. 5 pertaining to stop-loss policies). 
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insurance regulation and thus subject to more exacting preemption 
scrutiny, proves in 1999 to be far more problematic than it was in 
1974. 
Or consider the now-common practice by which insurers set 
premiums for particular employers based on the employer's own 
claims experience in the preceding year. At one level, policies 
issued in this fashion look like traditional insurance since the 
insurer assumes the risk that the quoted premium (based on the 
prior year's outlays) will cover claims for the current year. On the 
other hand, in this context, there is, for the long run, no pooling of 
risk between different employers; over time, each employer is in 
effect its own risk pool with its premiums set to cover its outlays. 
In an important sense, the employer in this setting is self-funding 
over time since its premiums reflect its own anticipated experience 
based on the employer's own past experience. 
Formalistically, it is sensible to view policies issued in this 
fashion as insurance subject to state regulation as such. However, 
as a matter of substance, the employer can, with minimal economic 
impact,^^" avoid that regulation by declaring that it will henceforth 
self-insure with the carrier hired as plan administrator of the new 
self-insured plan. This suggests, again, that section 514's 
distinction between insurance and non-insurance regulation is 
today too permeable to be useful. 
My conclusion that Congress should repeal section 514 stands 
even if the Court embraces the reasoned textualist approach I 
recommend; that approach is the best means of making section 514 
workable; however, the limitations of even that approach suggest 
the rescission of section 514 as the ultimate course in this area. 
This conclusion is prompted, in particular, by my reading of 
ERISA as permitting state tort actions against service providers 
hired by plans, but not against plans themselves.^^' That reading is 
a faithful construction of the text and a significant improvement 
over the ciurent jurisprudence of ERISA preemption which, per 
Dedeaux and Shaw, precludes all tort actions against plans and 
providers alike. 
21" In the short run, this impact would occur in a year when the employer's workforce 
claimed unpredictably large medical benefits. A self-insured employer would (absent stop 
loss coverage) be responsible for all of such benefits; under a "traditional" insurance 
policy, with premiums reflecting the employer's prior experience, the unexpected benefit 
obligation for the current year would instead be the insurer's responsibility. In the long 
run, however, the employer would absorb the costs of these unanticipated benefits even 
under "traditional" arrangements since the employer's premium for future years will be 
increased to reflect the previously unpredicted (but now known) level of benefits for its 
workforce. 
215 See discussion supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text. 
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However, the statute's distinction between service providers 
(subject to state law liability for their mistakes) and plans which 
perform all functions in-house (not subject to state tort law 
because such plans are covered exclusively by ERISA section 502) 
lacks, as a matter of policy, any compelling justification in the era 
of managed care. Moreover, the distinction creates an artificial 
incentive for plans to provide services in-house to avoid the cost of 
tort liability even when third parties can furnish such services 
better and/or more efficiently.^^® Hence, my conclusion that 
section 514 and its policy of broader than normal preemption 
should be repealed, thus allowing the states to supplement the 
remedies of section 502, in particular, tort remedies against plans. 
This conclusion does not assume that our current tort system 
is, in theory or practice, a model of jurisprudence. It merely 
postulates that, whatever the rules of tort liability are to be, there 
is no reason today for distinguishing, as the text of ERISA does, 
between service providers and plans. 
Critics of the current tort system are tempted to embrace 
section 514 as an ad hoc, albeit accidental, tort reform as section 
514 and its expansive preemption of state law blocks application of 
state tort rules in the context of employer plans. For a critic of 
those rules, this is not an insignificant victory. Moreover, the 
political pressure of those with economic interests in limiting tort 
liability has been decisive in resisting—so far—legislative efforts to 
modify the substance of ERISA preemption doctrine. 
However, for the long run, the statute's distinction between 
plans and service providers is no longer viable intellectually or in 
practice. As a matter of theory, there is no reason in the era of 
managed care why third party service providers hired by employer 
plans should be subject to state tort liability while plans 
performing the same functions in-house are not. Moreover, this 
reading of the statute, while textually compelling, will, for the long 
run, lead plans to shift functions from contract service providers to 
in-house personnel to avoid the costs of tort liability—even 
though, in many cases, outside service providers may be more 
efficient than in-house personnel. 
All of this suggests that, if the tort system should be modified, 
that modification should occur directly, not through the backdoor 
of ERISA preemption. 
I also disagree with those who would amend, rather than 
repeal, section 514."^ In general, those who would modify section 
21® Presumably, the fees charged by third party service providers will reflect their state 
law tort liability, liability which is eliminated by providing services in-house. 
2" See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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514 would carve an exemption from ERISA preemption for state 
tort law similar to the existing exemptions for state securities, 
banking, insurance, and criminal laws. 
My disagreement with such amendment is that it would not go 
far enough. The underlying problem is not the impact of ERISA 
preemption in the area of tort liability, but rather the impropriety 
of the basic policy reflected in section 514, i.e., the greater than 
normal scope of ERISA preemption. 
The most compelling construction of section 514 is that it 
creates a presumption for preemption and a zone of employer 
autonomy as to the substance of welfare plans. While the courts' 
role is to implement that statutory command, the Congress's role is 
to assess whether, a generation after ERISA's initial adoption, that 
command makes sense today. Since I answer that inquiry in the 
negative, I view the amendment of section 514 as a palliative; at its 
most basic, there is no reason for special preemption rules in the 
ERISA context and, hence, no reason for retaining section 514. 
CONCLUSION 
In several senses, ERISA is a difficult statute. Much of 
ERISA is technical and dense, a veritable "statutory thicket"^'® 
through which even experienced experts often have trouble 
making their way. Section 514 is difficult in a different sense, a 
provision which understandably tempts the reader towards a 
mechanistic textualism, but which, read in this fashion, leads to 
consequences most observers would consider unacceptable. It is 
by no means obvious how section 514 ought thus be understood. 
Neither the Shaw approach, an exemplar of dictionary-based 
textualism, nor the Travelers formula are ultimately satisfactory 
formulations of ERISA preemption. The interpretative strategy 
best labeled reasoned textualism is not without its own drawbacks. 
It is, however, the most workable construction of section 514 and 
ERISA preemption. The alternative—to effectively disregard the 
statute—is unacceptable whether such disregard is framed as the 
implementation of some higher legislative intent or as a candid 
recognition that the text is being discarded. 
Ultimately, the integrity of a system of statutory law depends 
upon taking statutes seriously. 
218 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE M. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT 
TAXATION vii (4th ed. 1972); see also Special Committee on Pension Simplification, New 
York State Bar Association, ERISA: A Process Still Awry, A Need to Simplify, 83 TAX 
NOTES 1053 (1999). 
